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COMMENTS ON THE CONSUMER FINANCE
INDUSTRY'S PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE POSITION
OF SECURED CREDITORS IN CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY CASES*
JOSEPH E. ULRICH**
Creditors who sell and finance the purchase of consumer goods are
extremely unhappy with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978' (Code).
They feel that the new Code is a debtor protection law that has tilted the
risk of loss to them more than necessary for nonpayment on consumer
sales.' One of their primary complaints is that certain novel aspects of
the Code unfairly jeopardize purchase money liens on consumer goods.
Creditors point to the redemption section as impairing their security
since it permits the debtor to buy these goods for less than the contract
* This study was made possible in part by a grant from the Frances Lewis Law
Center. The author wishes to thank my colleague, Professor Lewis H. LaRue, and Pro-
fessor Jeffrey Morris of the University of Dayton Law School for their helpful suggestions
on an earlier draft of this article and especially Ms. Carol Hoshall, a second year law student
at Washington and Lee, for her research assistance on this article.
** Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Code), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 11U.S.C.
§§ 101-15132d (Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as B.R.A.].
See Papers delivered at the Consumer Bankruptcy Seminar-Public Policy Choices,
sponsored by the National Retail Merchants Association and the National Consumer
Finance Association in Washington, D.C..(Feb. 1981); W. MAPOTHER, CREDITORS AND THE
NEW BANKRUPTCY CODE 5 (2d ed. 1980) ("of all the legislation imposed on the consumer
credit industry, none has had such an immediate and changing impact as the new [bank-
ruptcy] code"). Record Statement of Claude Rice, Esq., Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., Esq., and Pro-
fessor Jonathan M. Landers On Problems of Consumer Creditors Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, in 35 PERSONAL FINANCE L. Q. R. 158, 165-66 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Rice,
Wiese, and Landers].
In addition to their criticism of the Code's treatment of purchase money liens,
creditors decry the narrowing of the fraudulent financial statement exception, B.R.A. §
523(a)(2), and its companion, B.R.A. § 523(d), which grants attorneys fees and costs to a winn-
ing debtor under B.R.A. § 523(a)(2); the "excessive" federal exemption B.R.A. § 522(d); and
the failure of the preference section, B.R.A. § 547, to permit creditor retention of all funds
paid to them for consumer debts under $5000 within six months of bankruptcy. Although
they object to the innovations made within the traditional bankruptcy scheme, the creditors
offer a more fundamental complaint. They assert that the discharge for consumers does not
properly reconcile the interests of consumer debtors and creditors. They argue that the
discharge of all eligible debtors for virtually all debts runs counter to the fundamental
premise of the consumer credit industry that consumer debt will be repaid out of future in-
come rather than present assets except in the last resort. The creditors think that a form of
mandatory Chapter 13 should be enacted for consumer cases. This position is ,succinctly
stated by Young, The "Straight" Bankruptcy Ripoff, 34 PERSONAL FINANCE L. Q. REP. 131
(1981).
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price.4 They are equally displeased by the Code's impediments to reaffir-
mation agreements.' Quite correctly, they assert that these changes im-
pose an additional risk of nonpayment.6
A related complaint concerns the increased expense of protecting
secured claims on consumer debts7 in the bankruptcy process. Creditors
view the Code as a lawyer's employment relief act.' Under the Bankrupt-
cy Act of 1898 (Bankruptcy Act),9 professional creditors ordinarily took
care of their own affairs in consumer cases without continued recourse
to a lawyer. ° Once properly briefed, most of them were quite capable of
handling mundane legal business such as filing a proof of claim for
unsecured debts11 or protecting a secured claim on consumer goods.
1 2
When negotiations with the debtor concerning the secured property
were necessary, the creditors performed quite competently. In the case
of the secured creditor this has changed. No longer is he able to protect
himself. As one creditor's attorney recently emphasized, the "use of an
B.R.A., supra note 1, § 722 (as construed). See text accompanying notes 42-51 infra.
From the creditors' perspective, B.R.A. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), the Chapter 13 "cram-down" provi-
sion, causes a difficulty similar to the increased expense of protecting secured claims on con-
sumer debts. For a description of the working of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), see Comment, Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Chapter 13 Cramdown of the Secured Creditor, 1981 Wis. L.
REV. 333 [hereinafter cited as Chapter 13 Cramdown].
5 B.R.A., supra note 1, § 524(c) & (d) (as construed). See text accompanying notes 29-38
infra.
, A starting point in the strategy of all creditors' attorneys is that their client can
best protect themselves against a discharge by becoming a secured creditor in particular
property of the debtor. See A. COHEN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
ACT OF 1978 1-2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as COHEN]. The Code alters this view, for secured
status does not offer the protection it once did. See notes 42-51 infra (use of standard other
than replacement cost to determine value of goods reduces value of security interest).
B.R.A., supra note 1, § 101(7).
8 Commenting on the Code in a Congressional hearing Representative Drinan observ-
ed, "I realize it is a full employment bill for lawyers." Proposed Bankruptcy Revision. Hear-
ings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32 Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1861 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
House Subcommittee Hearing]. One cannot help but wonder, however, how much of the
creditors' unhappiness is due to the existence of a new set of rules which has altered their
past procedures.
' Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Bankruptcy Act), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 1103 (1976) (superceded by
B.R.A., supra note 1).
" Mapother, Bankruptcy Strategies for Representing Creditors in Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 Cases, 86 Com. L.J. 133 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Mapother]. My discussions
with lawyers for professional creditors throughout Virginia are in accord in Mapother's
statement.
I Under the Act a briefing on bankruptcy procedures by a lawyer was necessary for a
creditor. See Schrag & Ratner, Caveat Emptor-Empty Coffer: The Bankruptcy Law Has
Nothing to Offer, 72 COLUm. L. REV. 1147, 1168-76 (1972) (description of difficulty encoun-
tered by nonlawyer creditors in comprehending forms and properly filing a proof of claim in
bankruptcy).
11 See generally Kennedy, The Secured Lender and the Bankruptcy Act, 3 U.C.C. L.J.
13 (1970) (secured creditor's rights under the Bankruptcy Act).
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attorney by a secured creditor cannot be considered a luxury, it is an
economic necessity dictated by good business judgment."'3 The creditors
assert that such "necessary" legal fees increase the cost of bankruptcy
unnecessarily.
As one would expect, the creditors have not suffered in silence. In
addition to lobbying against many of the novel provisions of the Code
prior to and after its passage, 4 they have offered legislation to amend
the new statute. The Consumer Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1981
(CBIA) is one example. 5 The CBIA is the product of the consumer
finance industry. 6 Many of its provisions are aimed at enhancing the
secured creditors' post-bankruptcy position. In examining these provi-
sions, I will look first at the ways the Code affects the rights of creditors
holding consensual liens on consumer goods, and second, indicate how the
CBIA would alter the present law. Only then may the merits of the
CBIA be explored.
Bankruptcy's Effect on the Secured Creditor
in Chapter 7"
To understand better the creditors' complaint, it will be helpful to
describe the continuing relations between a consumer debtor and
secured creditors in a Chapter 78 case under the Code from the creditors
perspective.'9 Assume that Dunn files for relief under Chapter 7 on
January 15, 1981. Dunn "owns" a one-year old Ford automobile which
she purchased from Carr and a one-year old washer/dryer combination
purchased from Mees. Both Carr and Mees hold purchase money secur-
ity interests on the goods they sold, and both are authorized by their
Mapother, supra note 10, at 133.
" See, e.g., House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 8, at 1359-69 (statement of
Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr., on behalf of the National Consumer Finance Association); Rice, Wiese,
and Landers, supra note 2, at 162-72 (statement of Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr. and others, on behalf
of the bankruptcy discussion group).
IS Consumer Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1981 (CBIA), H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as C.B.I.A.]. The text of the OBIA is set out in the Appendix.
" The consumer finance industry includes retailers, oil companies, consumer bankers,
finance companies, and credit unions. The industry is represented by various associations,
formal and informal. Among these associations are the National Retail Merchants Associa-
tion, the National Consumer Finance Association, the Bankruptcy Discussion Group, and
the National Association of Credit Management. The Personal Finance Law Quarterly
Report is probably the most prominent organ of these organizations.
" Chapter 13, which governs adjustment on debts, presents almost identical problems
for the secured creditor of consumer goods as those discussed in the Chapter 7 context. See
C.B.I.A., supra note 15, §§ 16-19. The changes suggested for Chapter 7 should be mirrored
in Chapter 13.
" Chapter 7 governs liquidation under the Code. For an excellent discussion of all the
essential aspects of Chapter 7, see Rendleman, Liquidation Bankruptcy under the '78 Code,
21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 575 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Rendleman].
' The text is based upon those decisions which have placed creditors in the worst
possible position. Decisions more favorable to creditors are indicated in the notes.
1982]
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security agreements to repossess their collateral on default." As of
January 15, Dunn was behind in her payments to both, but neither
creditor had repossessed as of that date.2 '
Once bankruptcy occurs, neither Carr nor Mees may repossess their
collateral because of the automatic stay of collection activity.22 Nor may
either creditor get in touch with the debtor to discover what she intends
to do with the collateral." While creditors may communicate with Dunn's
attorney,24 there is no obligation on her attorney's part to indicate
Dunn's plans with regard to these goods. 5 T'hus, unless Dunn breaks the
silence, there is no contact between the parties until the first creditors'
I While default is an extremely significant concept under Article 9, default is not
defined in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The omission was intentional, for the
U.C.C. draftsmen assumed that the security agreement would define default. See
Honeywell Information Sys., Inc. v. Demographic Sys. Inc., 396 F. Supp. 273, 276-77
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally Davenport, Default, Enforcement and Remedies under
Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VAL. U. L. REv. 265 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Davenport]. For an example of the default terms commonly written in-
to a security agreement, see D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS & CREDITORS, CASES AND
MATERIALS 174-81 (1978), especially paragraphs IV through VI.
21 For the secured creditors rights authorized by the U.C.C. on default, see R. HENSON,
HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 357-81 (2nd
ed. 1979); Davenport, supra note 20, at 267-97.
' B.R.A., supra note 1, § 362a(3) & (5); In re Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581, 592 (D. Utah
1981). The B.R.A. § 362 automatic stay precludes collection activity against the property in
the debtor's possession until the case is either dismissed or closed. B.R.A., supra note 1, §
362(c). If a creditor with a valid lien desires to have the stay lifted before this time, he must
file an adversary proceeding. B.R.A., supra note 1, § 362(e); INTERIM BANKR. R. 4001(a).
With reference to permissible communication between the bankrupt and her
creditors, the Judiciary Committee report on the B.R.A. notes:
The commencement of a case under Chapter 7, Liquidation, operates as a
stay of all creditor action against the debtor or his property. The stay is the first
part of bankruptcy relief, for it gives the debtor a respite from the forces that led
him to bankruptcy. Frequently, a consumer debtor is severely harassed by his
creditors when he falls behind in payments on loans. The harassment takes the
form of abusive phone calls at all hours, including at work, threats of court action,
attacks on the debtor's reputation, and so on. The automatic stay at the com-
mencement of the case takes the pressure off the debtor. Once the debtor has
commenced the case, all creditors' rights against the debtor become rights against
the estate. Creditors must seek satisfaction of their claims from the estate. The
automatic stay recognizes this by preventing creditors from pursuing the debtor.
H.R. REP. No. 95, 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125-26, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5963, 6086-87 [hereinafter cited as House Report] (citations omitted).
" See Womack v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re Womack), 4 B.R. 632, 633-34 (EfD.
Tenn. 1980) (creditor may contact debtor's attorney about collateral without risking charge
of harassment in violation of B.R.A. § 362).
1 There are real pressures on the debtor's attorney to contact the debtor concerning
collateral. The attorney's refusal to cooperate with the creditor could result in the creditor
becoming more antagonistic to the debtor than otherwise. If the debtor is injured as a
result, the attorney's fees could be reduced by the court. B.R.A., supra note 1, § 329(b).
Thus, failure to cooperate in this setting could be seen as a breach of the attorney's ethical
responsibilities. Furthermore, a debtor's attorney who gets a reputation as a recalcitrant is




meeting."6 This means that the bankrupt retains possession and use of
the collateral free for at least several weeks.' During this period the
value of the property inevitably will decline, adversely affecting the in-
terests of Carr and Mees.1
At the first creditors' meeting on, say, February 15, the creditors
may lawfully inquire of Dunn as to her intentions. Dunn has the follow-
ing options: she may enter into a reaffirmation agreement with the
creditors, voluntarily turn the collateral over to her creditors, seek to
redeem the property, or do nothing at all. From the creditors' standpoint
the first and second alternatives would seem preferable. Yet, even these
two present problems. Let us consider each in turn. Assume that Dunn
enters negotiations to reaffirm her contract on the car, and agreement is
reached. Congress did not favor reaffirmations in the Code, because such
arrangements often proved to be a principal cause of repeat bank-
ruptcy.2 Thus, even after the parties work out an agreement satisfac-
tory to themselves, the bankruptcy court at the discharge hearing"
might void the new bargain as not being in the best interest of the deb-
tor." In addition, the debtor has 30 days after the judge's approval to
" For a description of the purposes of the first creditor's meeting, see 2 W. COLLIER,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 341.01 (15th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. See also
DeNatale, The Creditors' Committee under the Bankruptcy Code- A Primer, 55 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 43, 43-44 (1981) (first creditors' meeting is far more significant in reorganization
cases than consumer bankruptcy). Creditors holding liens on the debtor's automobile do at-
tend these meetings for the purpose of seeking reaffirmations. Creditors with liens on less
valuable items ordinarily do not.
" Interim Bankruptcy Rule 2003(a) provides that the "court shall call a meeting of
creditors to be held not less than 20 nor more than 40 after the order for relief." INTERIM
BANKR. R. 2003(a).
" See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 607-08 (1974) (value of merchandise
declines steadily as buyer's use continues).
"A primary purpose of consumer bankruptcy is a fresh start for the debtor through a
discharge. Reaffirmation agreements thwart the discharge. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
177 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BANKRTUPCY COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission recom-
mended that reaffirmations be made unenforceable. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT,
supra, Recommended Bill § 4-507. H.R. 8200, § 524(b) adopted the Commission position. See
also House Report, supra note 23, at 163-64, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 366. The Senate would have permitted all reaffirmations. Thereafter the two bodies
worked out a compromise. B.R.A., supra note 1, § 524(c), (d) (reaffirmations permited in
limited situations). The compromise is described in the Informal Committee Report at 124,
reprinted in CONG REC. H. 11096 (daily ed.,Sept. 28, 1978). A comprehensive discussion of
the legislative history of B.R.A. § 524(c) and (d) may be found in In re Blount, 4 B.R. 92, 93-97
(M.D. Tenn. 1980).
m One of the duties of the bankrupt is to "appear at the hearing required under section
524(b) of this title." B.R.A., supra note 1, § 521 (4). The B.R.A. § 524(4) discharge hearing has
two purposes. First, to inform the debtor that a discharge has been granted or the reasons
why it has not been granted; second, to counsel the debtor concerning any reaffirmation
agreements which have been made. The second matter is more significant. See note 31
infra.
't One commentator has predicted that B.R.A. § 524(d) will eliminate reaffirmations ex-
cept in a very limited number of situations. That commentator has stated:
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unilaterally reject this contract.2 These uncertainties make reaffirma-
tion agreements less attractive to creditors than they were under the
Bankruptcy Act.3 Furthermore, if the reaffirmed contract subsequently
is rescinded or the debtor defaults, the debtor still retains possession of
the property for an extended period without paying for it. 4 To reclaim
the property after rejection or default, the creditor must file an adver-
sary proceeding at a cost of sixty dollars" to lift the stay. 6
Since it is difficult to conceive of a reaffirmation agreement which is in the best in-
terest of the debtor except, perhaps, when actually further credit would not be
available to the debtor in the absence of a reaffirmation, it seems quite likely that
a court would approve only those reaffirmation agreements which are in settle-
ment of nondischargeability actions or which provide for redemption.
Ahart, Obtaining Reaffirmations of Individual Debts Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 97
BANKING L.J. 153, 156 (1980). Such decisions as In re Hinkle, 9 B.R. 283 (D. Md. 1981); In re
Delano, 7 B.R. 72 (D. Me. 1980); In re Berkich, 7 B.R. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1980); American Express
Co. v. Griffin (In re Griffin), 13 B.R. 591 (S.D. Ohio 1981); and In re Jenkins, 6 B.C.D. 471
(E.D. Va. 1980), bear out Ahart's prediction.
3 B.R.A., supra note 1, § 524(c)(2). The thirty day period is the analogue to the cooling
off period found in § 429.1 of the Home Solicitation Sales Act, which has been adopted in
some states. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-134a to -143 (West. Supp. 1980); VA. CODE
§§ 9.1-21.1 to -21.7 (1973). That Act provides that a contract may be rescinded anytime
before midnight of third business day after the transaction. See also 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1981).
' A reaffirmation of a pre-bankruptcy debt was valid under the Act if permitted under
state law. See In re Thompson, 416 F. Supp. 991, 996 (S.D. Tex. 1976). For developments
under prior law, see Boshkoff, The Bankrupt's Moral Obligation to Pay His Discharged
Debts: A Conflict Between Contract Theory and Bankruptcy Policy, 47 IND. L.J. 36 (1971).
1 The B.R.A. § 362 automatic stay must be distinguished from the stay found in
B.R.A. § 524. See text accompanying notes 22 & 23 supra. After the debtor receives a
discharge at the discharge hearing and the court validates all reaffirmations, the case is
closed. B.R.A. § 362(c). The § 524(a)(2) stay permanently enjoins creditors from the employ-
ment of any process to collect a discharged debt. In the example in the text, the debtor is
relying on § 524(a)(2). Some courts have held that § 524(a)(2) requires the creditors enforcing
valid liens to seek to have the stay lifted. See C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 10; Recommending
Notes to Proposed Consumer Bankruptcy Improvement Act of 1981 32 (April 1, 1986) (copy
on file in WASHINGTON AND LEE REVIEW office) [hereinafter cited as Recommending Notes], 3
COLLIER, supra note 26, 524.01[3], argues, however, that the § 524(a)(2) stay was never in-
tended to "prevent post-discharge enforcement of a valid lien on property of the debtor ex-
isting at the time of the entry of the order for relief, providing such lien was not avoided
under the Code."
Filing fees are set by the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1930(b) (Supp. III 1979). The current fee of sixty dollars was set at the Judicial Con-
ference Session held March 7-9, 1979. Id., app. § 1930. Thus, each plaintiff filing an adver-
sary proceeding must pay the sixty dollar fee, even if the matter is prefunctory. Adversary
proceedings are defined by Bankruptcy Rule 701 and Interim Bankruptcy Rule 7001.
Bankruptcy Rule 701(6) provides that actions to lift an automatic stay are adversary pro-
ceedings. There is authority that no fee need be paid in this setting. See note 40 infra. For
an adequate protection hearing pursuant to B.R.A. § 363, one of the most complicated and
time consuming proceedings under the Code, no filing fee is required.
B.R.A. § 362(e) provides that the stay shall be terminated 30 days after the request
for relief is first made unless a party in interest objects. On the tactics involved, see 2 W.
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE 1 38 (1981). Notwithstanding § 362(d), typical litiga-
tion over lifting a stay is protracted. As a result, creditors engage in litigation over the stay
only as a last resort. See also note 34 supra.
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Consider a variation on this theme. Dunn does not formally reaffirm
but continues to make payments to Carr and Mees pursuant to the
original contract. One might call this an "implied reaffirmation""7 agree-
ment. Dunn pays under the contract for five months and then defaults.
Under the Code the creditors may not repossess their collateral until the
stay is lifted, which requires an adversary proceeding." Again, substan-
tial use without payment occurs.
In the alternative, suppose Dunn chooses to release the automobile.
At least two hurdles still must be cleared before Carr obtains possession
of the Ford. First, the trustee must abandon the property. 9 Second, the
creditor must file an adversary proceeding to lift the automatic stay.0
At the resulting hearing the debtor might indicate the intention to
redeem, for her right to do so has not been extinguished.41 This calls for
a valuation hearing. All of this causes delay and increases expenses.
* Discussion with Virginia lawyers specializing in bankruptcy indicates that "implied
reaffirmation" is a common occurrence.
" See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra. Where the reaffirmation fails because the
debtor rescinds or defaults, three additional questions come to mind. First, may the creditor
keep any payments received under the reaffirmation before the contract is terminated? The
Code is silent. Second, does the debtor have any right of redemption? See note 41 infra. And
third, where the debtor fails to keep the collateral insured, what can the creditor do? Must
the creditor seek adequate protection under B.R.A. § 363? Again, the Code does not say.
19 B.R.A., supra note 1, § 554; BANKR. R. 608. The trustee will only abandon property if
it is of no value to the estate. Once abandoned, the property passes to whomever has a right
to possess it, and the trustee may not reclaim it. If the trustee refuses to abandon the prop-
erty, a hearing is necessary. B.R.A., supra note 1, § 554(b)..If the trustee and the bankruptcy
clerk's office act expeditiously to close the typical estate, the stay may be lifted automatic-
ally within 90 days of filing. See id. § 362(c), °§ 704(1).
40 See, e.g., In re Loving, Chapter 7 No. 7-80-00961 (W.D. Va. 1980) (B.R.A. § 362 stay
remains in full force and effect pending filing of adversary proceeding even though trustee
abandoned property). Five of Virginia's six bankruptcy judges agree with Loving. The
bankruptcy judge in In re Mullins, 7 B.R. 1 (C.D. Cal. 1980) concurred with the approach
taken in Loving, but this decision was reversed on appeal. In re Mul lins, 10 B.R. 346 (9th
Cir. 1980) ($60 fee not necessary where parties stipulate for abandonment).
What causes the dispute in this area? Once the property is abandoned and, therefore,
no longer part of the estate, why can't the creditor accept the property? Part of the problem
stems from the cryptic language found in the House Report relating to B.R.A. § 362:
Subsection (c) of § 362 specifies the duration of the automatic stay. Paragraph (1)
terminates the stay of an act against property of the estate when the property
ceases to be property of the estate, such as by sale, abandonment, or exemption.
It does not terminate the stay against property of the debtor if the property
leaves the estate and goes to the debtor.
House Report, supra note 23, at 343, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6299. In addition bankruptcy judges have an obvious incentive to characterize all possible
proceedings as adversary proceedings, for the amount of money allocated to each bankrupt-
cy court for administration expenses depends on this count. Cf. note 29 supra.
" B.R.A. § 722 does not state when the right to redeem terminates. As yet, the cases
have not decided the question. Apparently, the period for redemption is left to the discre-
tion of the court. Dictum from Baskins v. Household Finance Corp. (In re Baskins), 14 B.R.
110 (E.D.N.C. 1981) states that "a debtor may redeem certain property pursuant to 11
1982]
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Redemption was an innovation for bankruptcy.2 It is also the hub of
the secured creditors' complaint."3 The bankrupt may redeem household
consumer goods subject to consensual security interests by paying the
creditor an amount equal to the item's value. If the parties cannot agree
on value, it is determined by the judge in an adversary proceeding. Ob-
viously, the meaning of "value" is crucial. The Code, however, furnishes
no specific standard for value:" instead, it provides that "value shall be
determined in light of the purposes of the valuation and of the proposed
disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing
on such disposition or use on a plan affecting the creditor's interest.""
The legislative history indicates that the context for the valuation will
be all important.46 For redemption the measures at the two extremes are
replacement47 cost and forced sale price." While the courts have used
many yardsticks,49 the majority have leaned toward the forced sale stan-
U.S.C. § 722 after the discharge has been granted and, if necessary, as case may later be
reopened by the court 'to accord relief to the debtor.' "Id. at 111. See also Catholic Credit
Union v. Siegler (In re Siegler), 5 B.R. 12, 15 (D. Minn. 1980) (court ordered secured creditor
to notify debtor of impending the sale of repossessed collateral after debtor failed to exer-
cise right to redeem within time specified by court). The court's action in In re Siegler
amounts to a second right of first refusal for the debtor.
42 The right of redemption found in B.R.A. § 722 was borrowed from the Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 9-506. For the operation of this section, see 4 COLLIER, supra note 26, 722.
See text accompanying notes 50-55 infra.
" Cf. B.R.A., supra note 1, § 522(a)(2) (definition of value for purpose of exemptions).
's B.R.A., supra note 1, § 506(a). The general standard of value contained in the Code
also is used to value assets in business reorganization cases.
4 House Report, supra note 23, at 356, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6312.
" Replacement value is that which the debtor would have to pay to replace the col-
lateral, that is, the depreciated retail price. This is the standard employed in CBIA § 6.
"8 A forced sale will produce liquidation value; the amount recoverable upon prompt
resale of separate assets at a judicial sale. An intermediate measure of value would be what
the property would be worth to the debtor, that is, what would the debtor pay to keep the
property. Presumably, the debtor would pay less for her used property than new items, but
more for the goods than the forced-sale price. For example, under the Act the trustee quite
often sold household goods back to the debtor rather than sell them at a judicial sale, since
the debtor would pay more for them than an ordinary purchaser. See Shuchman, Little
Bankruptcies in New England, 56 B.U.L. REV. 685, 697 (1976). Such a measure of value
would be subjective. Yet, since courts often find value to lie somewhere between replace-
ment cost and forced-sale price, such findings may indicate that the judges are attempting
to approximate this intermediate standard.
" In Catholic Credit Union v. Siegler (In re Siegler), 5 B.R. 12 (D. Minn. 1980), the
parties presented six appraisal figures to the court. After discussing the six separate for-
mulas, the court decided upon "the lien redemption value" as the amount which the debtor
"would have to pay a willing seller like the plaintiff in cash or equivalent to purchase prop-
erty of like kind and quality in its present condition" the court said that figure represented
the same amount plaintiff would obtain "after deliberate sale" and deduction of repair ex-
penses. Id. at 14. The end result was closer to forced sale than replacement cost. In re Stum-
bo, 7 B.R. 939, 939-40 (D. Colo. 1981) (forced-sale); In re Beranek, 9 B.R. 864, 865-66 (D. Colo.
1981) (open market value); In re Klein, 10 B.R. 657, 659-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (commercially
reasonable value); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 11 B.R. 391, 394 (N.D. Ga.
[Vol. XXXIX
SECURED CREDITORS
dard." Given that most consumer goods decline substantially in value on
sale, use of a standard other than replacement cost inevitably reduces
the value of the security interest. A specific example indicates how, to
varying degrees, the redemption innovation as presently interpreted
allows the debtor to benefit in this setting. Assume that Dunn purchased
her washer/dryer for $800, with payments to be made over four years
with interest. Nine months after the purchase she filed bankruptcy and
thereafter elected to redeem. Using a forced sale standard the court
finds the washer/dryer to be worth $250 and orders Dunn to pay Mees
$250 cash within thirty days or give up possession. Assuming Dunn has
paid $100 prior to bankruptcy; redemption enables her to purchase the
washer/dryer for $350, $450 below the market price. Moreover, when
value is determined as of date of the hearing rather than bankruptcy,"
the creditor's security interest, as measured by the property's intrinsic
value, is worth less after bankruptcy than before regardless of which
yardstick is used.
Notice how redemption affects the post-bankruptcy negotiations of
the parties.2 It should be a crucial element of the debtor's bargaining
1981) (wholesale value); In re Damron, 8 B.R. 323, 325-26 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (commercially
reasonable value); In re Walsh, 6 B.C.D. 793, 794 (D.D.C. 1980) (forced-sale); McQuinn v. Dial
Finance Co. (In re McQuinn), 6 B.R. 899, 900 (D. Neb. 1980) (replacement value).
In valuation hearings much depends on who the creditor is and the market in which he
offers the goods for resale. For example, an automobile dealer probably could show a higher
value for an automobile than a financial institution since the latter does not sell goods at
retail. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Cooper (ln re Cooper), 7 B.C.D. 24, 25 & n.1 (E.D. Ga. 1980).
0 See cases cited in note 49 supra except McQuinn. See also Chapter 13 Cramdown,
supra note 4, at 338-43 (cases dealing with valuations of consumer'items in Chapter 13). The
principles for valuing consumers property for either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 should be the
same.
One certainly could argue that the forced-sale standard is appropriate in the context of
redemption. When the debtor defaults, the creditor is entitled to repossess the property
and resell it. Where the resale price does not cover the debt, the creditor ordinarily would
be entitled to a deficiency decree. In bankruptcy, of course, the debt usually will be
discharged. B.R.A., supra note 1, § 727(b). Thus, the debtor comes out of bankruptcy with
those goods that are necessary to his fresh start at a reduced price, and the creditor sub-
sidizes the debtor to that extent. See text accompanying note 154 infra.
"' The Code does not dictate the date on which value should be determined. The
bankruptcy courts have not agreed on timing for valuation. See, e.g., Pierce v. Industrial
Savings Co. (un re Pierce), 5 B.R. 346, 347 (D. Neb. 1980) (date of valuation hearing); Virginia
Nat'l Bank v. Jones (ln re Jones), 5 B.R. 736, 739-40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (date of proceedings re-
questing valuation); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Willis (in re Willis), 6 B.R. 555,
557-58 (N.D. 11. 1980) (date of filing of petition). The Willis decision asserted that the choice
of date was not significant since the fluctuations in value would be small and within the
usual margin of error in initially establishing value. The court further indicated that this
rule for valuation would apply to cases under both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 since the
choice of dates was similar in both sets of cases.
I= The close connection between reaffirmation and redemption is evident. The
Bankruptcy Commission would have abolished all reaffirmations but permitted redemp-
tions. BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, Recommended Bill § 4-504 & 4-507;
see note 29 supra.
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strategy. Assume Dunn decides to retain her washer/dryer. She, or more
probably her attorney, negotiates with Mees over the terms of a reaffir-
mation. When Mees offers to reaffirm the original contract of sale, Dunn
counters by pointing out that she can redeem for far less. This compels
the creditor either to accept terms less favorable than the original con-
tract or take his chances with the judge's decision as to value. Mees does
have some leverage, for the debtor must pay cash to redeem. 3 Thus,
there is pressure upon both parties to work out a new arrangement
which lies somewhere between these extremes. 4 Nonetheless, the re-
demption section places the bankrupt in a position to improve her posi-
tion against creditors holding valid-in-bankruptcy liens.55
Assume now that Dunn and Mees cannot reach a new agreement,
and Dunn chooses to redeem. If Dunn and Mees cannot agree as to the
collateral's value for this purpose, the court does this for them in an
adversary proceeding. At such a hearing both parties need be repre-
' GMAC v. Stewart (In re Stewart), 3 B.R. 24, 24-25 (N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Zimmer-
man, 4 B.R. 739, 740-41 (S.D. Cal. 1980). General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Miller (In re
Miller), 4 B.R. 305, 307 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Cf. D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 169 (2d ed.
1980) ("it is unclear whether the payment under § 722 must be a cash payment"). B.R.A. §
524(c)(4)(B)(II) seems to contemplate redemption by means of a promissory note. B.R.A. §
524(c) appears to authorize the court to approve a reaffirmation agreement which facilitates
redemption by the debtor. Where the parties agree on the value of the collateral to be paid
by installment with interest, the court may permit this form of reaffirmation at the
discharge hearing. Interest is allowed only where there is redemption by installment. In in-
stallment cases, the contract rate of interest is employed. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward v.
Hall (In re Hall), 11 B.R. 3, 5 (W.D. Mo. 1980); In re Caroll, 7 B.R. 907, 909-10 (D. Ariz. 1981);
Clark v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Clark), 10 B.R. 605, 606-07 (C.D. Ill. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 11 B.R. 729 (9th Cir. 1981).
The parties often agree on value. See Hobson v. Rich's Employee's Credit Union (in
re Hobson), 11 B.R. 220, 221 (N.D. Ga. 1981); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Miller (In
re Miller), 4 B.R. 305, 307 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Credithrift of Am., Inc. v. Meyers (In re
Meyers), 2 B.R. 603, 604 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Bankruptcy judges always encourage the parties
to settle this matter. See, e.g., Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Jones (In re Jones), 6 B.C.D. 965,
966-67 (E.D. Va. 1980).
There are creditors who do not wish to deal with debtors after bankruptcy. Professor
Morris points out that in Atlanta the General Motors Acceptance Corporation would not
enter reaffirmations. Because debtors seldom have free cash, they seldom redeemed. As a
result, debtors often used a low percentage Chapter 13 plan of reorganization. In addition,
Professor Morris and others have indicated that many creditors do not like reaffirmations of
amounts under $300 because of their high administrative costs. Where the debtor has a bad
credit history, creditor reluctance to continue their relations is even stronger. This too may
push debtors into Chapter 13. Cf. Comments of U.S. Trustee Frank Dicello, note 62 infra.
m The word "lien" is defined in B.R.A. § 101(28) as a "charge against or interest in
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Some liens that are
valid outside of bankruptcy may be avoided in a bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, B.R.A. §
522(f) empowers the debtor to invalidate certain liens on exempt property, and B.R.A. §§
544, 545, 547, 548, and 549 enable the bankruptcy trustee to strike down certain transfers
that create liens. See generally Rendleman, supra note 18, at 609-46.
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sented by counsel,"6 and each may call experts.57 Considering the small
amount which often is at stake, this is a relatively expensive process. 8
Moreover, there is always the possibility that, after the court deter-
mines value, Dunn might forego redemption.5 9 This does not mean that
Dunn would turn over the property immediately to Mees; rather, Mees
still must pay sixty dollars to file an adversary proceeding to lift the
automatic stay. Since the collateral remains in Dunn's possession
without charge until the automatic stay is lifted, Dunn's "free ride" con-
tinues.
Finally, the debtor may do nothing. Because of the automatic stay,
the creditor cannot immediately compel the debtor' to release the
goods." No doubt the debtor's attorney will explain to her client that the
creditor's costs of seeking court assistance to enforce his rights to
possession may be charged to the debtor. Nonetheless, unnecessary
delay and expense may arise. To this extent, therefore, the 'Code en-
courages stalling by Dunn. She retains the collateral without cost, until
the creditor is in a position to force its return. Proper maneuvering can
extend this process well beyond the first meeting of creditors.' The loss
to the creditor includes not only the inevitable reduction in value of the
collateral but also the various costs of reclamation of the collateral from
the debtor.2
Bankruptcy Rule 7001 defines "adversary proceeding" as: "A proceeding before a
bankruptcy judge for legal, equitable or declaratory relief which arises under nonbank-
ruptcy law is an adversary proceeding governed by part 7 of the bankruptcy rules." INTERIM
BANKR. R. 7001. The note to Rule 7001 points out that the Rule acts as a supplement to the
adversary proceeding rules in Rule 701. Part VII of the bankruptcy rules is an adaptation of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bankruptcy. Despite certain modifications intended
to speed up bankruptcy litigation, an adversary proceeding is much like any other lawsuit
and therefore requires legal advice.
" The creditor's statement of the value of the collateral in his proof of claim is prima
facie evidence. In re Busman, 5 B.R. 332 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing House Report, supra note
23). The debtor may rebut by offering testimony, including her own, as to value. In re
Damron, 8 B.R. 323, 325-26 (S.D. Ohio 1980). Expert opinion can also take the form of ap-
praisers' valuations or reference to industry standards, such as the National Automobile
Dealers Association Blue Book. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Willis (In re
Willis), 6 B.R. 555, 557 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (present value of automobile is equal to average trade-
in value as shown in Blue Book).
"See note 49 supra.
5' Dunn might not be able to pay cash or may have discovered a better alternative.
Technically, the trustee should take possession of the debtor's property. In fact,
trustees ordinarily do not.
" See, e.g., First Bank & Trust Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 8 B.R. 1020, 1021 (N.D.N.Y.
1981) (seven month retention of collateral).
62 The fees the creditor encounters in trying to take possession of the property include
those for an attorney, experts, payment for the adversary proceeding, and, in most cases,
time away from work for the creditor or his employees. For creditors, moreover, these fees
may be incurred every time collateral is in the debtor's possession on the date of bankruptcy.
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The CBIA Proposals
The consumer finance industry's proposals contemplate both pro-
cedural and substantive effects. Their procedural proposals are aimed at
preventing delay in determining what happens to collateral following
bankruptcy. Their substantive proposals are intended to limit the deb-
tor's alternatives to either accepting the original contract terms thereby
maintaining the value of the security interest or voluntarily returning
the property to the creditor shortly after the petition is filed.
a. The Procedural Changes: Speeding up the Process.
Rather than give the debtor until the first meeting of creditors to
decide upon a course of action, the CBIA would impose upon her the
duty to notify a secured creditor within ten days of bankruptcy of her
plans concerning the collateral.63 Thus, she must indicate quickly
whether to claim the collateral as exempt, redeem, reaffirm, or return it
to the creditor.64 To facilitate these choices, the CBIA would permit the
creditor to communicate with the debtor about this one matter only.65 If
the debtor fails to notify creditors of her intentions by the first meeting
of creditors, the stay will be lifted automatically, and the creditor may
enforce his lien. When a debtor does give notice and a dispute subse-
quently develops, the stay remains until the matter is resolved, with the
resolution occurring shortly after the first creditors' meeting. Thus, if
the debtor's claim of exemption is challenged, the judge would resolve
the issue immediately. Similarly, if the debtor seeks to redeem but the
parties disagree as to price, a valuation hearing would be held at, or
shortly after, the first creditors' meeting. 8 In sum, the final disposition
Disruption of business relations. increases costs. Simply accepting funds out of the or-
dinary course of business may generate administrative expenses. The United States
Trustee for the Eastern District of Virginia, Frank Dicello, states that on several occasions
he has called up creditors to inform them that he is able to pay them a percentage of their
debt in installments as the debtor's estate is settled. The creditors often respond that
where the amounts are small, less than forty dollars per month, it is administratively more
expensive for them to accept the money than to write off the debt completely. Consumer
Bankruptcy Conference, Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University (Oct.
26, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Washington and Lee Bankruptcy Conference] (transcript on
file in WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW office). Cf. note 54 supra.
I See C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 7 which amends B.R.A. § 521. Cf. BANKR. R. 13-201(a)
(requirement that Chapter 13 debtor file proposed planwithin 10 days of filing her petition).




" In the recommending note to § 7 of the CBIA, the creditors indicate that in those
"situations where there is a dispute over the respective rights of debtor and secured
creditor, or in the rare case where the trustee will assert an interest of the estate in such
property, the court may order the status quo to be maintained until any disputed matters
are resolved." Recommending Notes, supra note 34, at 2-3.
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of the collateral would be determined far more quickly than under the
Code. The creditors' proposal, of course, requires that the bankruptcy
judge preside at the first creditors' meeting in consumer cases to decide
the disputes which will inevitably arise."9 To offset this expanded
workload, the creditors would delete the discharge hearing.70
Plugging the CBIA proposals into our hypothetical case, Dunn must
make her intentions known to the interested creditor much more quick-
ly. She, or her attorney, will need to decide within ten days of filing her
petition whether to retain the collateral and the best method to accom-
plish this result. 1 The CBIA proposal probably will weaken Dunn's
bargaining position in negotiating a reaffirmation agreement, since the
creditor will be able to repossess the property more quickly and inex-
pensively.72 Under the Code the redemption hearing comes some period
after the first creditors' meeting, possibly as much as seven months
later,7" while under the creditors' proposals this opportunity for delay is
substantially reduced, forcing the parties to the bargaining table more
quickly. Dunn knows that she cannot keep her consumer goods for long
without payment. Since the creditor possesses the same information, the
settlement, if worked out, ought to be more favorable to tle creditor
than under the Code. Finally, if Dunn either fails to notify her creditors
or for one reason or another is not entitled to retain the collateral
because she neither reaffirms nor redeems, Carr and Mees are entitled
to an order directing Dunn to turn over the property without filing, and
paying for, an adversary hearing.74
b. Substantive Changes: Maintaining the Value of the
Creditor's Security Interest.
The substantive changes offered by the creditors would limit the ef-
fect of several of the innovations favorable to consumers found in the
Code. Three of these seem especially significant:
(1) Purchase money security interests75 currently are valued on a
case by case basis in redemption cases.76 In this setting the bankruptcy
69 See C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 4.
70 Id. § 10.
" See note 63 supra. To the extent that the new duty to decide promptly whether to
keep collateral would compel the debtor's attorney to become more involved with working
out the debtor's post-bankruptcy lifestyle, this change could be beneficial to the debtor.
Many debtors who go through straight bankruptcy merely obtaining a discharge are no bet-
ter prepared to meet their financial problems than they were before. Unless the attorney
explains to the debtor how to avoid financial problems in the future, the debtor will likely
be back in six years.
72 See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
" See note 61 supra.
" See note 35 supra.
7' See U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978 version) (definition of purchase money security interest).
71 A debtor may redeem consumer goods subject to either purchase money or nonpur-
chase money security interests. Since most nonpurchase money security interests are void-
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judge has much discretion in choosing the yardstick by which collateral
will be valued." The creditors' proposal calls for a more "objective" or
concrete standard for valuation in which value is established by simple
arithmetic as of the time the debtor files the petition:
The value of consumer goods which the debtor seeks to redeem
... shall be the greater of an established resale market price or
the original purchase price reduced by straight line depreciation
over the life of the property, which is presumed to be eight
years.
78
(2) Under the Code the bankruptcy judge must approve reaffirma-
tions, and the debtor is permitted to rescind the agreement within thirty
days of the discharge hearing.79 The creditors would delete the necessity
of court approval for reaffirmations and require notice to debtors of
their right to rescind the reaffirmation at any time within sixty days."
(3) The Code provides in section 522(f)(2) that nonpurchase money
security interests on certain goods claimed as exempt are voidable by
the debtor. 1 The creditors would reject this rule. Instead they propose
that a debtor could redeem such property by paying the creditor its "fair
market value" (forced sale) in installments.82
When Dunn's attorney plans Dunn's bankruptcy under these
changes, the attorney will realize that her client will have to pay more
for the car and the household goods. When consumer goods are sold,
their market value declines substantially upon sale. To varying degrees
the redemption innovation as presently interpreted allows the bankrupt
ed under B.R.A. § 522(f)(2) or are protected by state exemption acts, such as VA. CODE §
34-26 (Supp. 1981), redemption hearings ordinarily will involve purchase money creditors
who are undersecured. The primary exception will be cases where the nonpurchase money
security interest is upon an automobile.
' See note 49 supra. At a recent consumer bankruptcy conference held at Washington
and Lee, several Virginia judges made it quite clear that B.R.A. § 506 gave them latitude of
decision in this area. Washington and Lee Bankruptcy Conference, supra note 62, at 69-72.
supra note 62, at 69-72.
78 See C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 6.
7' B.R.A., supra note 1, § 524(c) & (d).
o C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 10. Where the debtor defaults after the sixty day period on
a reaffirmation contract, the creditors would amend B.R.A. § 524(a) to provide that it "does
not operate as an injunction against the enforcement of a lien that has not been avoided
under provisions of this title." C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 10(a)(4); see note 34 supra for an
explanation of the reason for this change.
"I B.R.A. § 522(f)(2) voids all nonpurchase money liens on a variety of items including
household consumer goods, professional tools of the trade, or professionally prescribed
health aids. B.R.A. § 522(f)(2) does not operate automatically. Such relief can be obtained
only by filing an adversary proceeding. See, e.g., In re Adkins, 6 B.C.D. 997 (S.D. Cal. 1980);
In re Dardar, 6 B.C.D. 352 (E.D. Va. 1980).
8 See C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 13. Redemption for goods subject to purchase money
security interests would remain unchanged, but value would be determined by the new
standard. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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to benefit from this fact. As indicated by a prior example," the Code
allows Dunn to make use of this decline in value to obtain these goods at
well below the original sale price, i.e. Dunn pays $250 to redeem an $800
washer/dryer. For the same situation, the creditors' method84 requires
Dunn to pay $700 to redeem. 5 In addition to increasing the value of the
security interest by $450, the creditor avoids hiring an attorney to
represent him, an expert witness to testify as to value, and since the
case is determined more quickly, the risk of harm to the collateral is
reduced.86
The above scenario indicates how the CBIA's proposals protect the
value of the security interest. This protection becomes even clearer
when one views the modification in the debtor's strategy caused by the
proposals. Redemption becomes a less attractive alternative than under
current practice. Dunn must pay the entire sale price immediately. For
most debtors this makes reaffirmation more attractive, since the parties
ordinarily agree to payment by installment." Increased use of reaffirma-
tions is the industry's goal, of course. They wish to return as closely as
possible to the situation which existed before bankruptcy. Rather than a
renegotiation post-bankruptcy, they prefer that the rights of the parties
be spelled out by the original contract which they drafted. Once reaffir-
mation becomes so attractive that it tends to be the norm, the judge's
capacity to void the arrangement must be abrogated. Thus, the CBIA
proposals abolish the reaffirmation hearing.88
Finally, the creditors' contrasting treatment for nonpurchase money
security interests should be noted. The creditors suggest that nonpur-
chase money security interests in consumer household goods, tools of
the trade, and health aids be permitted but be valued by a forced sale
standard with the debtor allowed to pay in installments." Acceptance of
such a position reduces the value of bankruptcy relief to the debtor
significantly. As a practical matter, a bankrupt family must have these
household items. If these are lost, they must be replaced, and such repur-
See text accompanying note 51 supra.
In redemption cases, the creditors call for use of the "established resale market
price" if one exists. C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 6. This standard seems to apply only to vehi-
cles because of the industry "Blue Book". See note 57 supra.
' See text accompanying note 78 supra. Clearly, one can manipulate the redemption
price by varying the depreciation period. If four years were the presumed depreciation
period, then Dunn would have to pay $600 instead of $700 to redeem. The eight year
presumption assures creditors that the value will be set as high as the contract price.
", I realize that C.B.I.A. § 6 only creates a presumption of value, and that the debtor
may rebut the presumption. Moreover, present Bankruptcy Rule 306(b) provides that the
amount of security is deemed binding unless someone objects. The gains to creditors are
two-fold: first, as amended by C.B.I.A. § 6, § 506(a) calls for a contract price standard of
valuation which would prevent use of forced sale price yardstick; second, the presumption
of value ought to be more difficult to overcome.
See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
,3 See C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 10.
See C.B.I.A., supra note 15, §§ 8 & 13; text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
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chases may start the bankrupt on the way to more financial problems.
The debtor does not start fresh. If bankruptcy is viewed as a debtor's
remedy, as part of her arsenal of remedies in pre-bankruptcy negotia-
tions with harassing creditors, the deletion of section 522(f)(2) lessens the
value of this option."
Evaluation of the CBIA Proposals
Consumer bankruptcy ought to implement three fundamental goals:
first, it should encourage efficient administration of the bankruptcy pro-
cess; second, foster the debtor's effort to obtain a fresh start; and third,
interfere with the rights of creditors as little as possible.9 Efficient ad-
ministration requires that the system should implement the policies it
was created to promote, that the costs of its operation should be
minimized, and that cases should be disposed of quickly.2 Most people
would argue that society benefits from the efficient administration of
the bankruptcy process. 3 Where a suggested change increases efficiency
as defined, it merits careful consideration.
Inevitably the latter two goals will conflict to some degree. The
redemption section of the Code, for example, offers a reconciliation of
this conflict by Congress favoring the debtor's interest more than in the
past. The debtor can buy back her consumer household goods for less
than the retail price. In effect, Congress permits the debtor to
renegotiate the contract of sale. That redemption concomitantly makes
the creditor's lien less valuable seems indisputable. 4 The creditors not
Describing the importance of B.R.A. § 522(f)(2), one commentator writes:
... [Tihe insolvent debtor is faced with a potentially endless series of execution
sales and may quickly conclude that any gainful employment in which he is engag-
ed will be largely for the execution creditor's benefit. What hope is there for the
debtor who finds himself in a financial morass from which he cannot escape on his
own? The quick answer is bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy is the process by which a debtor straightens himself up,
dismisses his creditors with a wave of his hand, and is reborn-albeit usually at
the price of disposing of the bulk of his property.
Accordingly, a debtor, faced with the unpleasant possibility of continuous
creditor action, and with no reasonable hope of extricating himself from his finan-
cial predicament, may elect to start fresh and eliminate his creditors by availing
himself of the bankruptcy remedy.
COHEN, supra note 6, at 1-2.
"' House Report, supra note 23, at 3-5 reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5964-65; BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 81, reprinted in COLLIER,
supra note 26, app., at 81.
92 See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 326-27 (1966).
" Those parties who would be adversely affected by my definition of efficiency may
not favor it as a goal of the bankruptcy process. For example, debtors might not wish for
evaluation cases to be disposed of quickly. Under the prior Act, creditors generally did not
wish to expand the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court because doing so would
reduce their power to delay. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 325 (1966) (by implication).
"' See text accompanying notes 42-62 supra.
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only challenge this congressional policy choice by characterizing it as
undue interference with liens, but also assert that the redemption sec-
tion as construed goes beyond that necessary to promote the fresh start
policy.
In evaluating the CBIA's proposed amendments to the Code one
must focus upon the three goals of the bankruptcy process. Where the
debtor's fresh start conflicts with the rights of secured creditors, effi-
ciency considerations may indicate how to avoid an impasse. In this
regard, experience under the Bankruptcy Act and the Code is extremely
valuable, for it indicates how the parties operate under different sets of
rules. As I shall attempt to demonstrate, when the CBIA's procedural
amendments are viewed in terms of their effect on the parties' strategy
in the bankruptcy process, they appear to be superior to the Code both
in promoting efficient administration and in reconciling the conflict be-
tween the debtor's fresh start and protection of secured creditors. The
case for the substantive changes proposed is far less clear cut.
a. Procedural Changes
Enactment of the CBIA proposals would improve the administration
of consumer bankruptcy cases by reducing both time and money spent to
resolve conflicts between debtors and secured creditors over consumer
goods. In this regard, the recommendations that the judge preside at the
first creditors' meeting in consumer cases and that the discharge hear-
ing be abolished seem particularly compelling. 5 Removing the judge
from the first creditors' meeting was a Code innovation. The reason for
this change is easy to understand. One goal of the Code was to raise the
status of bankruptcy judges." A judge ought to do judicial work, not
tend to administrative details.97 The judge, moreover, should not become
too closely associated with the case in any capacity; the judge may hear
so much information at the first meeting of creditors that he no longer
appears sufficiently impartial.98 The theory appears sound. Yet, it seems
's See text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
-9 See House Report, supra note 23, at 15-18, 22, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5976-80, 5983. See also Jackson, Bankruptcy Then and Now, 45 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 249, 270 (1971). Mr. Jackson reasons that:
It is important that the image of the bankruptcy court be favorable and one that
will inspire confidence in the Bankruptcy Act and in the administration of it. The
bankruptcy bar is equally as concerned as the public with the image of the
bankruptcy court, its facilities, its efficiency, and the competence of the personnel
of the court, including the referees, who carry the burden of the current heavy
caseload.
Id.
" House Report, supra note 23, at 89-91, repinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6050-53; BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 92-93, reprinted in CoL-
LIER, supra note 26, app., at 92-93.
'7 House Report, supra note 23, at 88-89, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6049-50; BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, at 93-94, reprinted in CoL-
LIER, supra note 26, app., at 93-94. Cf. note 159 infra.
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applicable primarily to reorganization cases, not to consumer bankrupt-
cies.99 One must recall that under the Bankruptcy Act, the judge per-
formed vital judicial functions as well as administrative functions at the
first creditors' meeting. 0 As the creditors note, these judicial functions
should be performed at that early stage:
Typically, the debtor will have possession of property subject to
secured claims, and only the judge can direct the debtor to
return the property, or can resolve questions regarding redemp-
tion. In this connection, the present recommendation should be
considered with the proposal that the debtor file the statement
indicating his intended disposition of collateral which is subject
to security interests .... This proposal contemplates that many
disputes regarding the statement and the debtor's proposed re-
tention or surrender of the collateral, will be resolved at the
meeting of creditors. In contrast, such disputed matters must
now be resolved in separate contested or adversary proceedings.
The Brookings Institute Report (D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM,
PROCESS, REFORM (1971)) and the BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 29, made
parallel attacks on the old Act's workings in the area of consumer bankruptcy. The former
greatly influenced the latter, and the Code descends directly from these two predecessors.
Both reports had their critics. See Presson, Let's Talk Some Common Sense About the Ad-
ministration of Consumer Bankruptcies, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 263, 277 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Presson]; Cyr, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Back to the Drafting Board, 48 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 45 (1974) [hereinfter cited as Cyr]. Presson argued that neither study
documented any of its findings in the consumer area, nor did either group contain any one
who could qualify as an expert in the consumer bankruptcy field. Presson, supra, at 267-71.
Judge Cyr asserted that the Commission's failure to perceive the flaws in the Brookings
Report and those inherent in its own proposals were due to the fact that its members
primarily were interested in business bankruptcies. Cyr, supra, at 46-47. Judge Cyr stated:
The problem in this regard is not with the Congress. Rather, the fact is that
those most concerned with bankruptcy law and-practice are concerned most with
its economic consequences, whether on an individual or societal scale. The
economic consequences are most substantial for all concerned in a so-called
business or commercial insolvency case than in a non-business or consumer case.
Cyr, supra, at 48 (emphasis in original). Cyr pointed out how much faster legislation is pass-
ed to take care of business bankruptcy problems than consumer bankruptcy problems. For
instance, it took Congress 36 years to correct the problem manifested by the Supreme
Court's decision in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934), concerning the most signifi-
cant aspect of consumer bankruptcies, the effect of a discharge. On the other hand, it took
only 11 years for legislation to overrule a decision forbidding fees to counsel working for an
informal credit commission, a comparatively insignificant change, but one significant to
those most concerned with business bankruptcies. Cyr, supra, at 49. For a criticism of the
Code based on similar considerations, see Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The
Full-Employment for Lawyers Bill, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 1, 20-28 [hereinafter cited as Aaron].
00 As the creditors point out, under the old Act the judge resolved disputes over the
scope of the debtor's examination at the .first creditors' meeting. In addition, the judge used
the first creditors' meeting to deal with the alleged deficiencies in the debtor's petition,
schedule, and exemption claims. See C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 4; Recommending Notes,
supra note 34, at 4.
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Such proceedings impose an additional cost upon both creditors
and debtors, without any corresponding benefit. 01
Of particular significance is the fact that debtors' attorneys in general
agree with creditors on this matter of judicial involvement for similar
reasons. Representatives of both debtors and creditors assert that the
bankruptcy judge should be available to make routine decisions early in
the proceedings, thus saving both sides time and money. Apparently,
neither side fears judicial bias on matters that subsequently might
arise. '
If the judge presides at the first creditors' meeting, the benefits of
deleting the discharge hearings seem evident. First, as several recent
bankruptcy decisions indicate, requiring the debtor always to appear at
the discharge hearing is burdensome and serves no beneficial purpose.
10 3
Second, the hearing increases expenses for the debtor and the court.
Debtors' attorneys, especially those living in rural areas, note that they
often refuse to take bankruptcy cases because they must make two trips
to court, one to the first creditors' meeting and a second to the discharge
hearing. This repetition necessarily doubles their costs and increases
their fees. If the bankruptcy judge presided at the first meeting of
creditors and if the discharge hearing were abolished, there would be
only one trip in most instances and, correspondingly, lower expenses and
fees.
The third argument in favor of judicial presence at the first
creditors' meeting is that the judge could better fulfill his counseling
function at an earlier point in the process. One purpose for the creation
of the discharge hearing was to impress upon the debtor the seriousness
of the bankruptcy process as well as explaining her rights and responsi-
bilities. The hope was that the aura of a federal court would impress
,., Id. at 4, 5.
,0 Statements of debtors' attorneys Richard Harman (Norfolk, Va.) and Harry Shaia
(Richmond, Va.) and creditors' attorneys George Fralin (Lynchburg, Va.) and David Adams
(Norfolk, Va.). See also House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 8, at 1359-69 (testimony
of Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr.).
'° E.g., In re Keefe, 7 B.R. 270, 271 (E.D. Va. 1980) (debtor's absence excused due to
mental breakdown); In re Killett, 2 B.R. 273, 275 (E.D. Va. 1980) (debtor's nonattendance ex-
cused because of military service abroad); In re Garber, 4 B.R. 684 (C.D. Cal. 198Q) (court
held that there is no duty for debtor to appear at discharge hearing). In Garber, Judge
Elliott had the following comments concerning the "requirement" that the debtor appear in
person at the discharge hearing:
This is an unusual requirement, to say the least. I am in full accord that reaffirma-
tion agreements should not be enforceable unless approved by the court.
However, the reason for requiring a debtor, who does not propose to reaffirm any
debt, to appear in court to be informed of his right escapes me, especially when
we consider that the debtor has already lost one day away from work to attend
the meeting of creditors. ...
4 B.R. at 685.
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upon the debtor the duty to make use of this opportunity to become a
useful, productive citizen. The first meeting of creditors would appear to
be the more appropriate time to make such an impression. ' The dis-
charge hearing is most often a perfunctory affair, but the debtor has
every reason to be alert at the first creditors' meeting.0 5 Abolishing the
discharge hearing also affects the Code's treatment of reaffirmations.'
Beyond question the CBIA proposals to speed up the process of
resolving disputes over collateral would lessen the effect of bankruptcy
on the secured creditor. The Code procedure, as it has developed, grants
the bankrupt a free ride for a lengthy period. Allowing the debtor to re-
tain free possession ignores the fact that the purchase money seller of
consumer goods has a substantial, perhaps a paramount, interest in the
collateral. Under current practice, however, his lien loses value steadily
as time passes, even though it is his only claim that ordinarily survives
discharge.
Did Congress intend to offer the debtor the strategy of delay to
bolster her fresh start?"°7 Dilatory tactics would be advantageous to the
104 If the judge were present, as the CBIA recommends in § 4, he could "provide
whatever counseling is deemed appropriate. Indeed, this might have more impact since the
bankruptcy experience will still be fresh and real. Such an approach would further em-
phasize judicial nature of a bankruptcy proceeding." See Rice, Wiese, & Landers, supra
note 2, at 169; cf. C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 10.
Of course, if one feared that the judge might acquire too much information, it is well
worth pointing out that the judge need not preside at the entire meeting but could leave
when the judicial phase ends or when the creditors question the debtor. Trustees have indi-
cated that they have had some problems getting debtors or their attorneys to comply with
the trustees' requests made at the first creditors' meeting. If the judge gave the order to
the debtor, the debtor or the debtor's attorney doubtless would comply.
105 The problems raised by the creditors regarding valuation of the debtor's assets
could be handled in an alternative manner. The judge could set up a separate calendar for
valuation cases and other matters arising at the first creditors' meeting. This alternative
meeting precludes the possibility of the judge hearing prejudicial evidence. This alternative
has been adopted by one court. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Willis (In re Willis),
6 B.R. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1980). This would free the court, moreover, from the mundane matters
which often arise at the first meeting.
'o' See text accompanying notes 157-162 infra.
'o See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). In Local Loan, the Court stated:
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to "relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free
from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes"
.... This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as
being of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfor-
tunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the
time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort ....
Id. at 244 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). Debtor rehabilitation, especially con-
sumer debtors, was emphasized by Congress in passing the Code. In describing the propos-
ed Code, the House Report noted that it "makes bankruptcy a more effective remedy for
the unfortunate consumer debtor." House Report, supra note 23, at 4, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5965-66. While the discharge is the most important aspect
of the fresh start, Congress was well aware that other benefits must be given to the debtor
to insure the adequacy of the bankruptcy law for consumer debtors. See note 111 infra.
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debtor, since filing the petition grants her free use of the property until
the automatic stay is lifted. Furthermore, the capacity to maintain ,the
status quo for an appreciable period would aid the debtor in negotiations
over reaffirmation. Nonetheless, I doubt that Congress intended to favor
the debtor in this manner. Admittedly, the fresh start of the consumer
bankrupt was a dominant consideration for Congress in revising the
bankruptcy 'laws. The House Report emphasized that the Bankruptcy
Act was not designed to provide adequate relief to the consumer
debtor.108 Creditors had developed methods to limit the benefit of
bankruptcy to the debtor so that she was no better off than ,before.
"Overbroad security interests on all of a consumer's household and per-
sonal goods, reaffirmations, limited state exemption laws, and litigation
over dischargeability of certain debts have all contributed to the con-
sumer debtor's post-bankruptcy plight."' 9 Correcting these and other
shortcomings was necessary for adequate post-bankruptcy relief design-
ed to grant the consumer bankrupt a fresh start. 0 The Code incor-
porates a number of innovations designed to achieve this goal."'
The novel redemption provision was a part of the fresh start policy.
This section attempted to reconcile the conflict between the debtor and
the secured creditor, according to the House Report, by allowing "the
debtor to retain his necessary property and avoid high replacement
costs, [without preventing] the creditor from obtaining what he is entitl-
ed to under the terms of his contract.""' Significant delay does impair
the secured creditor's position. Unless delay is a necessary incident to
the debtor's fresh start, amendments to speed up the process seem ap-
propriate.
Do the CBIA proposals overly inhibit the debtor's effort to begin
again? The proposal that the debtor notify secured creditors within 10
days about her plans for collateral in her possession does not seem
unduly burdensome. In choosing bankruptcy the debtor's attorney
should have considered which items her client would need and have plan-
ned accordingly.'' In Dunn's case, for example, if her fresh start depends
' In reviewing the provisions of the Act, the House Report stated: "The primary
thrust of the 1938 revision [of the Act] was toward business bankruptcies, because con-
sumer bankruptcy was not a significant factor in the 1930s. The Bankruptcy Act has not
kept pace with the modern consumer credit society." House Report, supra note 23, at
116-17, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6076-78.
' Id. at 117, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6077-78.
Id. at 117-18, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6077-79.
Il See B.R.A., supra note 1, § 722 (redemption §), § 524(c) (discharge hearing), § 362(a)
(automatic stay provision derived from BANKR. R. 401 & 601), § 524(a) (discharge injunction),
§ 525 (prohibition against discriminatory treatment of bankrupt), § 1325(a) ("cramdown" pro-
visions), § 1328 (discharge provisions).
"'House Report, supra note 23, at. 127, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6088.
"I See Rendleman, supra note 18, at 584-86; Wickham, Bankruptcy or Not? Advice for
Attorneys who Counsel Consumer Debtors, 41 TENN. L. REV. 667 (1974) (dealing with 1898
Act).
1982]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
on owning an automobile, her attorney should have worked out the best
method to achieve this result. If keeping the present vehicle is the bet-
ter option, the lawyer should test the reaffirmation possibilities before
deciding precisely how to proceed. Requiring that the decision making
process start shortly after bankruptcy does nothing to defeat the con-
gressional policy favoring the fresh start. It merely places upon the deb-
tor's attorney the duty to plan her client's estate immediately, one
similar to that found in Chapter 13.2"
Adoption of the creditors' approach means that the first creditors'
meeting becomes the time of decision.' If the parties have been unable
to work out a new agreement by that time, the debtor's choice is
redemption or abandonment of the property. The debtor still holds the
property free for at least 30 days, and probably more. The period is
ample for the debtor both to get her affairs in order and to work out a
settlement with creditors. More delay threatens substantial impairment
of the creditor's security. If the debtor can show cause why more time is
justified, the court could order an extension.
The possibility of creditor harassment does not significantly lessen
the merit of these proposed changes. One of the purposes of the auto-
matic stay is to prevent creditors from importuning debtors after
bankruptcy about pre-bankruptcy debts until the debtor has the oppor-
tunity to get her affairs in order."' The debtor's remedy if the creditor
oversteps is clear: several courts have granted debtors relief from
various forms of collection activities before the automatic stay has been
lifted."7 Whether the debtor will -inform her attorney about creditor
harassment is unclear.118 Conceding the problem exists, the change still
seems preferable.119
"I BANKR. R. 13-201(d).
115 See C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 7.
18 See note 23 supra; House Report, supra note 23, at 169-70, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6130-32; see also note 22 supra.
117 See, e.g., GMAC v. Miller, 13 B.R. 110, 118 (S.D. Ind. 1981) (damages and fees); In re
Elder, 12 B.R. 491, 494 (M.D. Ga. 1981) (attorney's fees); In re Womack v. City Bank & Trust
Co., 6 B.C.D. 543, 544 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (court costs and attorneys fees).
"' The communication between the debtor and her attorney will depend on the rela-
tionship which develops between them. Quite often in a Chapter 7 case the debtor's attor-
ney, or a paralegal, fills out the forms, explains to the debtor the benefits of the discharge,
takes a fee and then lets the debtor fend for herself. Such is the role of the attorney painted
by several studies of the bankruptcy process. See generally D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANK-
RUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 41-106 (1971). Whether the debtor will realize there is
.something that she can do about the abuse, or have enough confidence in the attorney to tell
of harassment, is another question. Under the system proposed by the creditors, however,
there is more pressure on the attorney to plan out the entire bankruptcy for the debtor, and
for this reason a better relationship between attorney and client may develop. Alterna-
tively, the new procedure may result in an increase of fees rather than services, reducing
even further the relief for the debtor. Predictions of which would result are difficult.
I Some debtors file bankruptcy pro se. Whether such people are entitled to extra pro-
tection seems debatable. While we should not require everyone to hire a lawyer, we must
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Although many of the procedural changes proposed by the creditors
have much to recommend them, the suggested method of change can be
improved. Where possible these changes should be implemented
through the new Bankruptcy Rules rather than by altering the statute.
The function of the Rules is both to standardize and improve the admin-
istration of the system."' All of the suggested changes except the revi-
sion requiring the judge to preside at the first meeting of creditors could
be implemented through the Rules.' This change could be accomplished
by following the lead of Judge Merrick who, in General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. v. Willis (In re Willis)," established a separate contested
calendar to decide all questions relating to disputes concerning collateral
in the bankrupt's possession. Such a rule could lead to increased effi-
ciency for all concerned. Finally, since most bankruptcy judges have ig-
nored the duty imposed on the debtor to appear at the discharge hearing
unless reaffirmation agreements are involved," a rule to this effect
would codify present practice. Implementing such changes through the
Rules rather than the legislative process would undoubtedly be easier
and occur more quickly."4
'b. The Substantive Changes
Throughout their proposals the creditors sharply distinguish be-
tween purchase money and nonpurchase money security interests on
consumer goods, desiring greater protection for the former." Congress
also recognized this traditional distinction, predicating section 522(f)(2)'s
avoidance powers upon it. This difference in treatment was based upon
assume that they understand the risk. The bankruptcy process is very complicated even for
attorneys, and I can see no reason why we should make a special rule for pro se cases, if the
rule suggested is generally beneficial.
" Suggested Interim Bankruptcy Rules have been promulgated. These rules were
revised due to the changes made in the Code.
, See generally, Kennedy, The Proposed Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms, 46
AM. BANKR. L.J. 53 (1972). A Bankruptcy Rule may not directly overturn a substantive com-
mand of Congress.
,n 6 B.R. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1980); see note 105 supra.
n See note 103 supra.
Only Congress can alter the Code. As Congressman Butler pointed out at the recent
Washington and Lee Bankruptcy Conference, Congress is in no mood to change a statute so
recently enacted. Washington and Lee Bankruptcy Conference, supra note 62, at 14-15. In
fact, one reason the present Code passed through Congress so slowly was that body's indif-
ference to it. Compare Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REv. 477 (1973), in
which the author discusses changes made in Article 9 to coordinate it with the Federal Tax
Lien Act. He points out that the "sponsors of the new Article 9 in effect have decided that it
may be easier to change the Code through action of at least fifty legislatures than to correct
the federal tax lien provisions by one act of Congress." Id. at 514. In contrast, a small body
of bankruptcy experts formulates the Rules. See generally W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAK-
ING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES (1981).
"I See C.B.I.A., supra note 15, §§ 6, 8, & 13. Purchase money creditors occupy a similar
favorable position in the UCC. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), 9-302(d), & 9-312(5) (1978 version).
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substantial evidence which indicated that creditors take nonpurchase
money security interests in tangible personal property, other than an
automobile, for their "in terrorem" effect.126 Professional creditors know
that such items have little resale value. The creditor does not rely upon
the value of the property subject to his lien to prevent loss on default.
Rather, he would prefer to threaten. the debtor with repossession in
order to compel preferential treatment for his obligation.1" This tactic is
standard operating procedure for many creditors." Unless the creditors
demonstrate more than the loss of their power to coerce, no reason for
change comes to mind. As Congress and others have stressed, avoidance
of nonpurchase money liens on consumer goods is a crucial part of the
debtor's fresh start.'" The creditors tacitly admit the weakness of their
position by agreeing that valuation in non-purchase money cases ought
to be on the basis of forced-sale standard, with payment by installments
permitted. 30 Acceptance of this standard, of course, would reintroduce
the evils Congress desired to nullify.
131
12 House Report, supra note 23, at 171-72, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6132-33.
" Describing creditor psychology with regard to taking security interests in debtor
property unrelated to the debt, the House Report on the Code states:
Frequently, creditors lending money to a consumer debtor take a security interest
in all of the debtor's belongings, and obtain a waiver by the debtor of his exemp-
tions. In most of these cases, the debtor is unaware of the consequences of the
forms he signs. The creditor's experience provides him with a substantial advan-
tage. If the debtor encounters financial difficulty, creditors often use threats of
repossession of all the debtor's household goods as a means of obtaining payment.
In fact, were the creditor to carry through on his threat and foreclose on the
property, he would receive little, for household goods have little resale value.
They are far more valuable to the creditor in the debtor's hands, for they provide
a credible basis for the threat, because the replacement costs of the goods are
generally high. Thus, creditors rarely repossess, and debtors, ignorant of .the
creditors' true intentions, are coerced into payments they simply cannot afford to
make.
Id. at 127, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6088.
12 According to legal aid lawyers, it is common practice in Virginia for lenders to ex-
tract from the debtor not only a security interest in all of the debtor's household goods, but
also a waiver of exemption. Many household goods are exempt in Virginia from all but pur-
chase money liens, and this exemption may not be waived. VA. CODE §§ 34-26, 34-28 (Supp.
1981). Cf. VA. CODE § 34-22 (Supp. 1981) (waiver of the homestead exemption permitted).
While creditors are well aware that nonpurchase money security interests are void in
Virginia, they still threaten to levy on such property. It is not unusual for the creditor to
bring a sheriff to threaten the debtor, and the sheriff, knowing no better, willingly
cooperates. When the sheriff comes to the door, the debtor, if possible, finds some way to
make payment on these debts. In this manner the creditors gain a preference.
" House Report, supra note 23, at 127-28, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6088-89.
10 C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 5.
... Discussion with attorneys for creditors who take nonpurchase money security inter-
ests indicates that they do not wish to repossess. One attorney told me that his client had a
strict policy against repossession of household goods. In addition, those who obtained non-
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In contrast to non-purchase money situations, Congress continued to
recognize purchase money liens on the consumer godds listed in section
522(f)(2).'32 Why not also permit the debtor to avoid the purchase money
lien on these items? Recognition of any lien on these items will adversely
affect the debtor's fresh start. As Congress clearly recognized the deb-
tor must replace items such as her furniture, kitchen stove, or clothing
regardless of whether they are subject to a purchase money or nonpur-
chase money lien. ' The difference in treatment of the two, however,
must be predicated upon a traditional view of the relative equities of the
parties. '34 The seller's interest in the goods is paramount until the pur-
chase price is paid. The debtor's interest is comparatively limited. If the
debtor defaults, the owner is entitled to reclaim his goods. In addition,
Congress failed to find evidence of those evil creditor practices which
served as the policy basis for section 522(f)(2).135 Thus, the purchase
money creditor remains a favorite of the law.3 '
purchase money interests prior to Oct. 1, 1979, the effective date of the Code, need not be
concerned with B.R.A. § 522(f){2). See Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank (In re Rodrock), 3
B.R. 629, 633-34 (D. Colo. 1980), affd, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981); Adams v. Parker (In re
Parker), 10 B.R. 562, 566 (M.D. Ala. 1981); In re Woods, 9 B.R. 325, 329 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
112 B.R.A. § 522(f) permits the debtor to void judicial liens and nonpurchase money
security interests. B.R.A. § 522(e) nullifies the effect of a waiver of exemption.
13 The House Report at 128 quotes the following conclusion of the Bankruptcy Commis-
sion in explaining the need for redemption:
The Commission's recommendation furthers the policy underlying the recom-
mendations as to exemption. For example, it does little good to allow the debtor
an exemption of wearing apparel, household goods, or health aids subject to an in-
defeasible security interest securing a purchase-money obligation, if the debtor
must pay more than the property is worth for the privilege of continuing to use
the property. The fair market value of such property is often substantially less
than the amount owed and little if anything can be realized upon forced disposi-
tion of the property. What the creditor really has is leverage to force payment
under the present Act, since continued use is conditioned on forebearance by the
creditor and forebearance is exacted at a higher price.
House Report, supra note 23, at 128, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
6089.
3 The traditional justification for the favored position of the purchase money lien is
ably set forth in 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.106E (A. Casner ed. 1952). A somewhat
different rationale justifying the privileged position of this creditor is delineated in J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 920,1042-45 (2d ed. 1980). The distinction
is so well ingrained in most lawyers that even the Treasury, during the heyday of the
"choateness" doctrine, conceded the priority of the purchase money lien against the govern-
ment's claims. See W. PLUMB & L. WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 80 (1972). Nonetheless, pur-
chase money liens are not sacrosanct. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), modified by
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). These decisions indicate that some limits on
purchase money creditors are permissible. How much, if any, of the philosophy of Fuentes
carried over into the Code is unknown.
'" But see note 133 supra. Retail merchants, however, seldom take security interest in
other goods of the debtor as other lenders often do. See notes 126 & 127 supra.
13 One might question the rationale for sustaining any liens on consumer goods. Cer-
tain kinds of creditors, such as grocers, hardwaremen, doctors, often grant credit but the
character of the product sold prevents their taking a security interest. In constrast, auto
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Yet, the Code does make definite inroads on this favored position. As
previously indicated" 7 the redemption section has enabled the debtor to
purchase her household consumer goods usually for an amount below,
sometimes substantially below, the original contract price. The varying
standards used reflect the bench's inability to define congressional in-
tent in this area. While the legislative history of redemption evinces a
purpose to allow the debtor to keep these goods for something less than
the going rate, how much less is not indicated.138 Congress deliberately
wrote a vague standard for all valuation situations into the Code, "9 in-
forming the judges that they must "determine value on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the competing inter-
ests in the case."'"4 The principal benefit of the present method is flex-
ibility. The judge has discretion to set value for each case, and such deci-
sion will have little precedential value. The principle appears sound. Each
case is treated individually.14' Yet, such a full blown inquiry is expensive
relative to the dollar amount at stake. To illustrate, let me again return
to Dunn's redemption of her washer/dryer. On my figures there was a
$450 variation depending on whether a forced sale or a replacement
measure of value was used. The difference is quite significant but one
must consider the other costs to the debtor. Attorneys' fees, possible ex-
pert witness fees, the debtor's loss of pay due to missing employment and
court costs could reduce this amount considerably. 43 And, of course, the
dealers and furniture stores who take indefeasible security interests obtain preferential
treatment to some extent solely on the basis of the nature of the product sole. In a con-
sumer case, should not all of the debtor's creditors share the loss pro rata? Is it more than
tradition which leads to favoring certain creditors? The justification may lie in the com-
paratively high investment in the particular item sold. The automobile is a clear example.
Yet, as the consumer finance industry itself indicates, sellers, including those with purchase
money liens, do not want.to repossess if they can avoid it. See C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 7
and accompanying recommending notes. Possibly, the traditional view is retained because
Congress was not certain how such a radical change would affect consumer sales, an area of
great importance to the health of the economy generally.
"3 See text accompanying notes 42-51.
In two places the House Report describes redemption as giving "a right of first
refusal to the debtor" for consumer goods. House Report, supra note 23, at 127, 381,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6088, 6337. Arguably, this language
means that "value" is determined by the amount the creditor could realize through his nor-
mal resale procedures. Some judges have attempted to use this as a yardstick. See note 49
supra.
' B.R.A., supra note 1, § 506(a).
1 House Report, supra note 23, at 356, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6311-12. See Aaron, supra note 99, at 13 n.94.
4I Several bankruptcy judges have indicated to me that they like the current practice
for just this reason. See Washington and Lee Bankruptcy Conference, supra note 62, at
71-72.
142 See text accompanying notes 51, 84-85 supra. In my illustration an extreme case was
intentionally chosen. Had the guidelines set forth by Judge Merrick been used, the washer
and dryer would have been valued at $640. See note 133 supra.
13 B.R.A., supra note 1, § 330, which deals with the compensation of attorneys, was in-
tended to overrule cases such as Moshein v. Beverly Crest Convalescent Hospital, Inc. (In re
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debtor might lose (or "win" less). Creditors, too, bear the same risks and
costs.144
From this experience under the Code, I conclude that using this pro-
cess to measure the value of consumer goods"' is unsatisfactory. Some
judges, who apparently share this view, have established guidelines for
future valuation contests involving consumer goods on the assumption
that it is not crucial to have a finely-tuned valuation standard in this
area."6 On this point I emphasize that neither debtors' nor creditors' at-
Beverly Crest Convalescent Home, Inc.), 548 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1976), and In re Spisak, 2
B.C.D. 1952 (N.J. 1977) which limited fees "on notions of conservatism of the estate and
economy of administration." House Report, supra note 23, at 329-30, reprinted in [19781 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6286. To prevent first rate attorneys from leaving the bankrupt-
cy field, attorneys are entitled to compensation based on the value of the services rendered.
Id.; Neville v. Eufaula Bank & Trust Co. (In re U.S. Golf), 639 F.2d 1197, 1201 (5th Cir. 1981).
Of course attorneys are not paid the legal rate of compensation for performing nonlegal ser-
vices. See In re Jones, 13 B.R. 192, 194 (E.D. Va. 1981); In re Underground Utilities Con-
struction Co., 13 B.R. 735, 738 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
The attorneys' fees for any case depend on the time spent and the standard charge of
the attorney for the work. For example, in In re Cipriano, 8 B.R. 697 (D.R.I. 1981), the at-
torney for a secured creditor was allowed to collect $350 (5 hours at $75) for services
rendered in connection with the valuation of an automobile in a Chapter 13 case, after the
attorney conceded that the time spent to prepare, execute and file a proof of claim could not
be recovered at his usual rate. Id. at 698-99. My discussions with several Virginia attorneys
indicate that collateral hearings usually take somewhat less than five hours of billable time.
As these cases become more routine, bankruptcy judges may decide that attorneys fees for
such cases ought to be awarded at a lower rate. Cf. Neville v. Eufaula Bank & Trust Co. (rn
re Golf), 639 F.2d at 1201 (12 factors to be considered in setting attorney's fees).
14 Some experts argue that adverse decisions in the bankruptcy courts are due to a
failure to hire competent attorneys and, therefore, the creditors' problems are of their own
making. One would think that economic considerations would compel the opposite result,
but several debtors' lawyers have also indicated that for the most part the creditors have
been poorly represented. These lawyers opined that very often not enough was at stake for
the better-heeled creditors to use their counsel on retainer.
1I My comments are not aimed at business reorganization matters where larger dollar
amounts are involved.
' See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Willis (In re Willis), 6 B.R. 555 (N.D. Ill.
1980). In Willis, Judge Merrick set out guidelines for valuations and his reasons for doing
so. Id. at 556-57. The guidelines were promulgated both to save court time and to explain to
the attorneys what was involved in such proceeding. Id. at 556-59. The judge created
several guidelines for particular types of property. For example, furniture would be valued
according to the following schedule:
Less than one year old 75%
One year to two years old 50%
Two to three years old 20%
More than three years old 0
Id. at 557. Appliances would be treated a little differently.
Less than one year old 80%
One year to two years old 65%
Two years to three years old 50/o
Three years to four years old 25%
More than four years old 10%
Id. Carpet and draperies would be valued by another schedule:
Less than one year old 25%
19821
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
torneys favor the present experiment on the ground that it is unduly ex-
pensive for their clients. Rather, both groups would prefer a standard as
precise as that of the CBIA's proposal or the judges' guidelines.'47
Deciding upon the standard which ought to be adopted is a more dif-
ficult, although less significant, question. The CBIA proposal incor-
porates a depreciated cost measure unless a "recognized market" for se-
cond hand goods exists.'48 A recognized market exists apparently only
for automobiles.149 For other goods the creditors suggest that value
should be equal to the "original purchase price reduced by straight line
depreciation over the life of the property which is presumed to be eight
years.""'5 Assuming "original price" means the amount that a cash
customer would pay, then the eight year depreciation standard pre-
One to two years old 10%
More than two years old 0
Id. at 558.
Finally, Judge Merrick created a docket for valuation hearings so that the attorneys
would not have to sit around his courtroom for a long time waiting for their case to be call-
ed. Id.; see note 122 supra.
1" Many Virginia attorneys have told me that when valuation cases, as well as other
kinds, are decided against their clients, the bankruptcy judges suggest an appeal.
Presumably this matter evenutally will reach the courts of appeals. While our system
resolves many legal questions in this fashion. I have difficulty believing this is the optimum
solution in this context. Appeals are not costless to either side. The amount involved is
often small, although it may be significant to the parties. Few bankrupts can afford to
litigate. For similar reasons most creditors do not want to. Even in those cases that do go up
on appeal, I am not sure that valuation questions are the kind that a court. of appeals could
resolve satisfactorily. A most significant task of any appeals court is to construct rules
which can be easily administered by trial judges. In a collateral valuation case, what kind of
rule may an appeals court offer? It might direct bankruptcy judges to use a particular yard-
stick, but most such yardsticks still would require a hearing of some kind. Or, the court
might create its own guidelines for use in bankruptcy courts throughout its circuit similar
to those developed by Judge Merrick. See note 146 supra. Yet, I wonder if a court of appeals
is in a position to know what is appropriate. Moreover, this alternative undoubtedly will
create conflicts among the circuits, leading to nonuniformity in the area of bankruptcy.
While some observers consider lack of uniformity tolerable as to exemptions, B.R.A. §
522(b)(2), similar considerations do not seem applicable in this area. The best decision for an
appeals court would be to direct trial judges to develop their own guidelines.
148 C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 6. Cf. text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
"' Several judges have adopted the National Automobile Dealers Used Car Guide
(NADA Blue Book) to value cares presumably because "it covers a broad series of transac-
tions between willing buyers and willing sellers, and the sellers (of the traded-in cars) are
consumers similar to the debtors before the court." General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Willis (In re Willis), 6 B.R. 555, 559 (N.D. Ill. 1980). See note 57 supra. Yet, most used car
dealers pay absolutely no attention to the NADA Blue Book in purchasing cars themselves.
While mileage is not irrelevant, it is comparatively unimportant. For the dealer who plans
to resell the vehicle, the question is how much will it cost to recondition the car in relation
to its potential resale value. For this reason, the NADA Blue Book probably seldom will be
determinative. Furthermore, since a good deal of money is often at stake, the dealers will
show up to defend their interest.
'51 C.B.I.A., supra note 15, § 6.
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cludes the debtor from taking advantage of the normal decline in value
which always occurs on the sale of consumer goods. Nonetheless, since
the "original price" can be determined easily,15' I think such a standard is.
appropriate, for it closely approximates the value of the goods to the
debtor. ' This standard seems preferable to one based on a forced sale
yardstick. Such a yardstick cannot be applied automatically. Nor does it
necessarily reflect what most creditors could get for the goods if
repossessed." Finally, I can find no good reason why retail merchants
ought to subsidize bankrupts to this additional degree.'"
Let me suggest an alternative method, one which retains some of the
benefits of the present practice but should lower its costs. By creating
the redemption section, Congress undoubtedly assumed that the parties
generally would settle on value. Where the parties settle outside of the
judicial forum, they should be more willing to accept the terms of the
settlement than if it is imposed from the bench. Any suggestion,
therefore, ought to foster settlement. Where the parties are not able to
settle, each party should submit a final offer to the court. The property
should then be valued by an appraiser, appointed from a panel by the
judge. The appraiser's decision would be final. The cost of the appraisal
would be paid for by the party whose final offer was most at variance
with that of the appraiser. 55 This alternative has several benefits: first,
151 The Truth in Lending Act requires that the base price be clearly stated. See 15
U.S.C. § 1638(a) (1976).
152 One could certainly argue that the retail price measures the value of the use of the
collateral to the debtor. When consumers purchase an item, its value to them is at least its
retail price, if one assumes that the debtor knows exactly what he is buying and how much
utility the good will yield. There are cases Where lack of information about the particular
good and its market make this assumption untenable, but in the case of automobiles as well
as most consumer goods, one must assume that consumers have adequate information
available to them.
Of course, one could manipulate the value of these goods under this standard by simply
presuming a shorter depreciation period. If one assumes, for example, that the depreciation
period is 4 years instead of 8, one lowers the presumed value of the goods. See note 85
supra. In the alternative, one might say that the presumed depreciation period win be
either the length of time of the installment contract or the length of warranty granted by
the seller. Such a rule might foster purposes external to the Bankruptcy Code.
15 See, note 49 supra.
I" The debtor's creditors subsidize the fresh start provided by bankruptcy in several
ways. The exemption laws might be viewed "as legalized frauds on creditors, in the
sense that they declare a public policy of having debtors retain certain essential aids to
their support in preference to the satisfaction of creditors' claims:' J. MACLACHAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 161 (1956). The discharge of most pre-petition debts
granted to most bankrupts under B.R.A. § 727(b) has a similar affect. See Rendleman, supra
note 18, at 679-81. Retail sellers, moreover, often operate in highly competitive markets
which make it difficult for them to spread this loss over other sales.
' The suggestion for determining which party should pay the appraisal costs is a
simplified version of final offer arbitration in labor settlements. See generally, Finille &
Long, Final-Offer Arbitration: "Sudden Death" in Eugene, 27 INDUS. AND LAi. REL. REV.
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each case is treated individually; second, the debtor gets some of the
benefit of the decline in value which occurs on sale; third, settlement
should be encouraged; fourth, the judicial time is saved; fifth, this pro-
cedure can be adopted by an appropriate bankruptcy rule.156
If valuation for redemption is determined by a concrete standard,
the reaffirmation problem should be less bothersome. The suggested
methods for valuation tighten up the present rather loose framework for
the redemption, thereby reducing uncertainty. Reducing uncertainty
should encourage the two sides to enter an arrangement satisfactory to
both, rather than one dictated by the court.
Finally, there is a question of whether the judge should continue to
determine the wisdom of the reaffirmed contract.15 Where the debtor
and her attorney work out the terms with the creditor, the answer
would seem to be no. So long as the debtor's counsel endorses the reaffir-
mation, this should be sufficient assurance that the debtor's interests
have been considered.158 The 60 day period to rescind might be retained
to determine whether the arrangement will work as the debtor anti-
cipated." 9 If counsel does not sign the reaffirmation, the debtor may
186 (1974); Howlett, Contract Negotiation Arbitration in the Public Sector, 42 U. GIN. L.
REv. 47, 71-74 (1973). One might accomplish the same result by having the expense of the ap-
praiser be part of the bankruptcy system, but this could lead to excessive use since the
parties would not bear this cost.
" See text accompany notes 119-24 supra. The CBIA proposals would require several
amendments to the Code.
... See text accompanying notes 32-34, 87-88 supra.
" When I wrote the accompanying textual sentence, I did not have the benefit of the
comments of Professor Morris who served on the trustee's panel in Atlanta for several
years. He writes:
I wish that I had the time to tell you about all of the ridiculous reaffirmations deb-
tors' counsel have proposed to the bankruptcy judges in Atlanta. Not only are
many of the attorneys who represent debtors incompetent to handle reaffirma-
tions problems, but even more are simply unwilling to do so. Your proposal seems
to put them in the "judges" shoes, deciding what is in the debtor's best interest.
In addition to the difficulties just noted, you are inviting animosity between the
debtor and her attorney in many cases.
Letter from Professor Jeffrey Morris to author (Dec. 15, 1981).
If Professor Morris' remarks accurately reflect the level of attorney competence in this
area, the underpinning for my suggestions certainly is flawed. Some responsible person
must decide this matter and if neither the debtor nor her attorney is competent, that leaves
the judge by default. This conclusion seems like an invitation to the judge to act as the deb-
tor's attorney which may have ramifications beyond this particular matter. A better solu-
tion might be for the judge to affirm the agreement that has been approved by counsel, and
then, if the agreement turns out badly, place the extra costs on the attorney as an incentive
to do better in the future.
119 Considering the difficulties that reaffirmation arrangements have caused in the
past, a period for rescinding reaffirmations seems appropriate. Since it is hoped that the
debtor's attorney will remain involved, the 60 day period will give the attorney time to see
how the contract works and whether it is in the debtor's best interest to rescind. Assuming
that the attorney is involved, his advice, as opposed to that of the judges, seems preferable.
See note 158 supra.
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need the protection designed into the reaffirmation hearing. In that case
the judge should review the agreement at the first creditors' meeting,
and if the terms are not as good as the debtor could obtain in some other
fashion, the reaffirmation ought to be rejected.1 0
The "implied reaffirmation" '161 should be treated similarly. Only if
counsel endorses such an arrangement by the first meeting of creditors
should it become binding on the debtor. This rule would place an increas-
ed burden on the creditor to make sure that all implied reaffirmations
were called to the court's attention at the first meeting of creditors, but
this duty is correlative with the increased responsibility imposed on the
debtor. The purpose of this obligation is to force the parties to formalize
the arrangement, guaranteeing for the debtor the protection that Con-
gress thought necessary for reaffirmations.
6 2
Conclusion
The treatment of creditors holding purchase money security in-
terests on consumer goods has caused problems apparently unforseen by
the Code's draftsmen. The CBIA's proposals are helpful in pointing to
methods by which these difficulties may be corrected. The good news is
that the more serious flaws can be corrected through the Bankruptcy
Rules. This should lead to quicker relief.
For me this experience points to a broader conclusion. The dif-
ficulties stemming from redemption and related innovations may be
traced in large part to Congress' decision to have the bankruptcy judges
evolve a common law for this area. As all lawyers know, litigation is ex-
pensive. Moreover, the common law generally develops slowly. On some
consumer bankruptcy matters, litigation cannot be avoided. Determining
whether a particular debt should be discharged16 a or whether a specific
16 While the Code's position does seem paternalistic, the creditors' position ignores
past history. Congress found substantial evidence that reaffirmation agreements have
harmed debtors. Furthermore, cooling off periods or notice provisions to the debtor in other
contexts alone have not provided a remedy against abuses. My proposal should encourage
creditors to keep the debtor's attorney involved, thereby benefiting all concerned.
16. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
,62 Suggested Interim Bankruptcy Rule 4002 provides that upon the debtor's request
-the court "shall defer the entry of an order granting a discharge for 45 days .... " and a fur-
ther delay can be obtained for cause shown. INTERIM BANKR. R. 4002. The purpose of the ex-
tension is to authorize time for the debtor to settle dischargeability litigation through reaf-
firmation agreements. Under Bankruptcy Rule 404(a), the court may fix a time not less than
30 or more than 90 days after the first creditor's meeting to file an objection to discharge,
and Rule 404(d) authorizes awarding the discharge immediately if no challenge to the
discharge is filed within this period. Finding Rule 404(d) inconsistent with B.R.A. § 524(c),
the Interim Rule 4002 authorizes the debtor 45 days extra to enter into reaffirmations. The
Interim Rule suggests its own limitation; the period for reaffirmation may be extended to
settle dischargeability questions. INTERIM BANKR. R. 4002. This special case should be
treated differently from reaffirmations generally. See note 31 supra. Otherwise, the reaffir-
mation should be voidable by the debtor.
' B.R.A., supra note 1, § 523(a).
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piece of property fits into a category of exemptions are examples. 4 On
the other hand, litigating the value of consumer goods for redemption
and other purposes seems a poor choice a priori. Congress failed to
decide how much of a benefit was intended, thereby aggravating the
situation.'65 The same difficulties have developed in Chapter 13 as judges
attempt to put a gloss on the phrase "good faith" in disputes involving
confirmation of the debtor's plan.
166
The lesson, if there is one, is that innovations for consumer
bankruptcy cases should contain definite standards where these are
possible. More definite standards are possible in this area. To ignore the
process by which these standards will evolve is largely to nullify the
benefits anticipated from the innovation.
1U See, e.g., B.R.A. § 522(d)(2)-(4). Even the categories of possible exemptions seem un-
necessarily vague. B.R.A. § 522(d)(10)(D) exempts "alimony, support, or separate
maintenance, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor." Does this mean that the bankruptcy judge overrides the decision
of the trial judge as to amount? See COHEN, supra note 6, at 104.
165 See text accompanying notes 137-40 supra.
16 B.R.A., supra note 1, § 1325(a)(3). See generally What Creditors Need to Know
About Chapter 13 Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Consumer Bankruptcy




Consumer Bankruptcy Improvements Act
A BILL
To amend title 11, United States Code, to establish an improved basis for
providing relief under chapter 7, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be
cited as the "Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1981".
SEC. 2. Section 109 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by in-
serting after subsection (e) the following new subsection:
"(f) An individual may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title only
if such individual cannot pay a reasonable portion of his debts out of anti-
cipated future income.".
SEC. 3. Section 305 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by in-
serting after subsection (c) the following new subsection:
"(d) The court may dismiss a case under chapter 7 of this title upon
the motion of any party in interest made not later than thirty days after
the meeting of creditors, and after notice and a hearing, if the debtor is
ineligible for relief under the provisions of section 109(f).".
SEC. 4. Section 341(c) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by striking out "(c) The" and inserting in lieu thereof
"(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection,
the", and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new para-
graph:
"(2) The court shall convene the meeting of creditors in a case in-
volving a consumer debtor under chapter 7 or chapter 13 of this title and
shall adjudicate any matters appropriate for resolution.".
SEC. 5. Section 342 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "The notice shall
include a copy of the statement of income and expenses specified in sec-
tion 521(2)."
SEC. 6. Section 506(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by striking out the last sentence,
(2) by inserting "(1)' "after "(a)", and
(3) hy adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(2) The value of the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in
such property shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valua-
tion and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in con-
junction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affect-
ing such creditor's interest. The value of consumer goods which the deb-
tor seeks to redeem pursuant to section 722 of this title or which are to
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be retained pursuant to section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) of this title shall be the
greater of an established resale market price or the original purchase
price reduced by straight line depreciation over the life of the property,
which is presumed to be eight years.".
SEC. 7. Section 521 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (4) by striking out "hearing" and inserting
in lieu thereof "meeting",
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) as para-
graphs (4), (5), and (6), respectively.
(3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new para-
graphs:
(2) if the debtor is an individual, file a statement of in-
come and expenses setting forth-
(A) the debtor's current income;
(B) an estimate of the debtor's current expen-
ditures for living expenses and the support of his family;
(C) All income which the debtor reasonably ex-
pects to receive within the two years following the petition; and
(D) all expenditures which the debtor reasonably
anticipates he will have to make within the two years following
the petition which are not included in subparagraph (B) above;
"(3) if the debtor's schedule of assets and liabilities in-
cludes consumer debts which are secured by property of the
estate, file and serve, within ten days after filing the petition,
upon each creditor holding such security and the trustee, a state-
ment expressing the debtor's intention with respect to retention
or surrender of the collateral and, if applicable, specifying that
the collateral is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to
redeem the collateral, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm
debts secured by the collateral;"
(4) by inserting "(a)" before "The debtor", and
(5) by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
"(b) At or before the meeting of creditors provided for by section
341 of this title, the debtor shall perform his intention with regard to
secured creditors, as specified by subsection (a)(3), by surrendering such
property to the creditor or the trustee, redeeming such property by pay-
ing the redemption price, or reaffirming the debt. The creditor may com-
municate with the debtor to facilitate such performance without being
held to have violated section 362 of this title. If the debtor has .not fully
performed his obligations under subsection (a)(3) and this subsection at
or before the meeting of creditors, the stay imposed by section 362 shall
terminate with respect to the enforcement of liens against such prop-
erty, unless the courts order otherwise.".




(1) by striking out paragraph (1),
(2) by striking out, "other than subsection (d) of this sec-
tion," in paragraph (2)(A), and
(3) by redesigning paragraphs (2)(A) and (2)(B) as
paragraphs (1) and (2), respectively.
(b) Section 522 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by strik-
ing out subsection (d).
(c) Section 522(f) of title 11; United States Code, is amended by
striking out "lien is" and all that follows through the period and insert-
ing in lieu thereof "lien is a judicial lien.".
SEC. 9. (a) Section 523(a) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) in paragraph (2)(A) by striking out "or actual fraud" and
inserting in lieu thereof "actual fraud, false credit history, or
falsification of other facts reasonably related to the debtor's in-
curring liability for the debt,", and
(2) in paragraph (3) by striking out "section 521 (1)" and in-
serting in lieu thereof "section 512(a)(1)".
(b) Section 532(d) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by striking out "shall" and inserting in lieu thereof
"may" (2) by striking out ", unless granting judgment
would be clearly inequitable" and inserting in lieu thereof "if it
finds that the proceeding was not brought by the creditor in
good faith", and
(3) by redesignating such subsection as subsection (e).
(c) Section 523 of title II, United States Code, is amended
by inserting after subsection (c) the following new subsection:
"(d) For purposes of subsection (a)(2) of this section, any
debt which is incurred on or within ninety days before the date
of filing a petition under this title, is presumed to be nondis-
chargeable under such subsection."
SEC. 10. (a) Section 524(a) of title II, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) in paragraph (2) by striking out "and" at the
end thereof,
(2) in paragraph (3)-
(A) by striking out the period and inserting in
lieu thereof "; and", and
(B) by striking out "523(d)" and inserting in lieu
thereof "523(e)",
(3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new
paragraph:
"(4) does not operate as an injunction against the en-
forcement of a lien that has not been avoided under the provi-
sions of this title."
1982]
WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WREVIEW
(b) Section 524(c) of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1) by inserting "and" at the end thereof,
(2) by striking out paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new
paragraph:
"(2) such agreement contains clear and con-
spicuous statement which advises the debtor that the agreement
may be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or within 60
days after it is entered into, whichever occurs later, by giving a
written notice of rescission to the creditor."
(c) Section 524(d) of title 11, United States Code, is amended to read
as follows:
"(d) At the meeting of creditors provided by section 341(c) of this ti-
tle, the court shall inform the debtor of the nature and effect of a
discharge."
SEC. 11. Section 547(b) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) in paragraph (4) by-
(A) amending subparagraph (B) to read as follows:
"(B) between 90 days and one year before the
date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of
such transfer was an insider;", and
(B) by striking out "and" at the end thereof, (2) in
paragraph (5) by deleting the period at the end of the paragraph
and inserting in lieu therefore "; and", and
(2) in paragraph (5) by deleting the period at the end of the
paragraph and inserting in lieu thereof "; and", and
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new
paragraph:
"(6) if such creditor at the time of such transfer had
reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at
the time of such transfer.".
SEC. 12. Section 544(c) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
striking out "section 521(1)" and inserting in lieu thereof "section
521(a)(1)".
SEC. 13. Section 722 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by inserting "(a)" before "An", and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsec-
tion:
"(b) upon notice and hearing, the court may require a creditor to ac-
cept payments in redemption of the value of a claim secured by a non-
possessory, nonpurchase money security interest in tangible personal
property, over a reasonable period not to exceed five years, if such
tangible personal property is-
"(1) household furnishings, household goods, wearing
apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments,
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or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family, or
household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
"(2) implements, professional books, or tools, of
the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor;
or
"(3) professionally-prescribed health aids for the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor."
SEC. 14. Section 1106(a)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is amend-
ed by striking out "section 521(1)" and inserting in lieu thereof "section
521(a)(1)".
SEC. 15. Section 1111 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
striking out "section 521(1)" and inserting in lieu thereof "section
521(a)(1)"
SEC. 16. (a) Section 1301(a) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) by inserting "and to the extent that" after "unless",
(2) by striking out "and (c)" and inserting in lieu thereof
"and (d)",
(3) in paragraph (1) by striking out "or" at the end thereof,
(4) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (4), and
(5) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new
paragraphs:
"(2) as between the debtor and the individual pro-
tected under this subsection, such individual received the con-
sideration for the claim held by such creditor;
"(3) the debtor has filed a plan pursuant to section
1321 of this title and such plan does not propose to pay the prin-
cipal of and interest on such claim in full; or".
(b) Section 1301(c) of title 11, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:
"(d) on request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing,
the court shall grant relief from the stay provided by subsection (a) of
this section with respect to a creditor for the reasons specified in
paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (a) of this section, or to the ex-
tent that such creditor's interest would be irreparably harmed by such a
stay.".
(c) Section 1301 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by in-
serting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
"(c) A creditor who proposes to act pursuant to subsection (a) shall
notify the debtor and codebtor of such intention. The debtor or codebtor
shall then have 10 days to file and serve a written objection to the taking
of the proposed action. If the debtor or codebtor does not file and serve a
timely written objection, then the creditor's action taken in accordance
with its notice shall not violate subsection (a)".
SEC. 17. Section 1321 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by inserting '(a)" before "The", and
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(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsec-
tion:
"(b) Payments under the plan shall be commenced at the time of
the filing of the plan. The payments shall be made to the trustee, and
shall be retained by the trustee until a plan is confirmed or not confirm-
ed. If any paln is confirmed, the trustee shall then distribute the funds in
accordance with the plan. If no plan is confirmed, the funds shall be
returned to the debtor after deducting the costs of administration".
SEC. 18. (a) Section 1322(a) is amended-
(1) in paragraph (2) by striking out "and" at the end thereof,
(2) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4), and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new
paragraph:
"(3) provide for payment, in deferred cash payments,
of the amount which could reasonably have been collected upon
the claims specified in section 523(a) within the period of the plan
as specified by subsection (c) of this section, as if this proceeding
had not been brought; and".
(b) Section 1322(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
amending paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) to read as follows:
"(1) designate a class or classes of unsecured claims,
as provided in section 1122 of this title, but may not discriminate
unfairly against any class so designated but may treat claims
which are specified in section 523(a) or involve a codebtor dif-
ferently than other unsecured claims;
"(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims,
other than a claim fully secured by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of
unsecured claims;".
(c) Section 1322(c) is amended to read as follows:
"(c) the plan may not provide for payments over a period of more
than five years."
SEC. 19. Section 1325(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended -
(1) in paragraph (3) by inserting ", and the plan represents a
bona fide effort which is consistent with the debtor's ability to
repay his debts, after providing support for himself and his
dependents," before the semicolon,
(2) in paragraph (5)-
(A) by amending subparagraph (B) (ii) to read as
follows:
"(ii) the value, as of the date of filing the plan, of prop-
erty to be distributed under the plan is not less than the value
determined under section 506(a) of this title and, if such value is
to be paid in installments, interest is to be paid at the rate.
specified in the consumer's contract; or", and
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(B) in subparagraph (C) by striking out "and",
(3) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (7), and
(4) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following new
paragraph:
"(6) the plan extends for a period of five years or the
plan provides for payments of at least 70 percent of all allowed
unsecured claims; and".
SEC. 20. Section 1328(c)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
"(2) of a kind specified in section 523(a) of this title to
the extent such claims were not proposed to be paid as part of
the plan.".
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